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Chapter 1.  Non-employee Unit Cost 
As a background to this study of non-employee* income we direct attention to 
Appeadix 1 and Chart 1,  designed as a succinct description of the trend of inflation in 
Ireland in recent years. 
As to Appendix 1,  of major importance for the present study is the contrast in 
trend between unit costs of employee remuneration and of Other income: in both·periods 
1958--1968 and 1968-1974 the rise in the former has been much greater than in the latter. 
(The distinction between Other income concepts (1)  and (2) will be dealt with later.)  It 
will also be seen that in both periods unit cost of employee remuneration increased more 
and of Other income less than retail prices (CPI) in Ireland. 
Very noteworthy is the fact that (to base 1968) the terms of foreign trade have 
I 
been substantially in Ireland's favour: (economically a phenomenon as valuable as a rise 
in oroductlvitv),  though unfortunately with a reversal in 1974.  We discuss Irish and 
Britleh price tren(ls presently,  in our comment on  Chart 1, remarking here only that, 
+ 
(lesmte admonition,  since 1968 the Irish index has systematically risen more than the 
++ 
UK  . index  (see Appendix 1). 
After generally lagging behind retail prices ln the period 1958-1971,  agricul-
tural prices forged ahead in 1971-1973 with,  of course,  enhanced lnflatlonary effect: note 
the great rises in retail prices and employee remuneration in 1973-1974. 
* 
+ 
For brevity,  in the text we usually term this "non-wage" or "Other". 
R. C.  Geary and J. L.  Pratschke: ''Some Aspects of Price Inflation in Ireland" ESRI, 
Paper No.  40,  1968,  advising that meticulous attention be given to keeping the Irish 
price trend at or below the UK  trend, in the interest of our exports thereto. 
+f':•j<' 
,  It is possible that the faster rise in the Irish CPI compared to the British RPI may 
have been due to differences in the weighting patterns between the two countries,  or 
~o differences in the rates of increase of indirect taxes less subsidies.  A recent 
'NESC report has examined these questions and  concludes in respect of the former 
that "during the period 1968-73, •••  a time of very rapid inflation,  ••• differences 
t·n weighting have imparted no specific bias in either direction • • •  Any  d~bts as to 
the comparability of the two index numbers can,  therefore, be safely ignored".  In 
regard to the effects of indirect taxation,  the report found  that changes i'n taxes could, 
e.t most,  explain only a small proportion of the difference between the UK  and Irish 
Indexes between 1968 and 1973,  though due to problems with the comparability of data, 
the evidence is not conclusive: 
E. V.  Morgan:  "Caus~s and Effects of Inflation in Ireland",  NESC Report No.  10, 
1  «l7~; (see especially the Appendix by s.  Scott). - {I  -
In Appendix 1 there is first mention of unit cost, a well-known concept con-
siderably exploited in this paper.  It is the quotient of the current value of any entity 
IGDP,  employee remuneration,  Other income etc.) divided by the corresponding volume 
of output,  i.e.  the value of the entity at constant prices, usually expressed in indei: 
number form.  It is the best economic indicator of the "price" of an entity.  If in year t, 
number of labour hours is Nt,  total current labour cost Lt' volume of GDP Yt'  all in 
index number form with same base year (say, 1968 as unity),  then-
Current cost of labour== Ct  ==  Lt/Nt 
Productivity of labour ='ff t = Yt/Nt 
so that-
Unit cost of labour= Lt/Y  t = Ct/7r t 
or,  in words,  unit cost of labour is the quotient of current money wages per hour by 
labour productivity.  Othf'r entities can be treated in an analogous way. 
Of course the graph for TGER in Chart 1 as in current money terms gives a 
grosslv exaggerated notion of the true situation as it affected employees: here it is · 
dElsigned merely to giv(' an idea of the magnitude of inflation.  In real terms (using; CPI 
as a deflator) TGER rose by 37 per cent between the fourth quarter of 1968 and the first 
quarter of 1975 and by 4. 3 per cent in the latest year (i.e. to first quarter 1975),  com-
pared with an annual average rate of 5. 4 per cent in the period from fourth quarter 1968 
to first Quarter 1974.  The sharply increased rate of inflation in 1974 has slowed dbwn 
somewhat labour's rate of improvement in standard of living. 
(chart  ~ 
Chart 1 shows on a logarithmic scale quarterly indexes of  UK and Irish retail 
prices and hourly TG employee remuneration from 1958.  It has been shown* that ih the 
period 1947-1965 there was a marked similarity between the trend in  UK and Irish retail 
prices, if in general conformity rather than simultaneity.  This is confirmed t-o  the eye, 
bv  Chart 1,  for the period 1958-1974 though,  as remarked above,  since 1968 the Irish 
*  Gearv and Pratschke, _QQ. cit., where it is shown that the "disparity index" betwe'n 
t.he prices is low though,  of course,  the internal Irish effect is considerable,  tetading 
to push the Irish figure in advance of that of the UK. 300 
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Chart  1  :  Avenge hourly earnings in TG industries, CPI (Ireland), RPI (UK); quarterly 
1958-1975. November 1968 as 100. (Logarithmic scale). 
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index has tended to rise more than the UK index.  It seems to us that Ireland  1 s 
intimate economic and social involvement with the immensely larger  UK  (i.e. UK 
cause, Ireland effect) must be a  major consideration for our findings and recommen-
dations. 
To make another important point,  we subjected the data for the two periods 
19f'8-1q68,  1968-1974 for the two Irish graphs on  Chart 1, i.e. four sets of data in all, 
*  to orthopol  analysis.  Applied to each of the two time periods,  this was equivalent to 
fitting a linear trend and  a curve of the second degree orthogonal to it in timet (in 
quarters).  Orthogonality means that the quadratic trend in each case can be superposed . 
on the linear. 
The eye do~s not deceive in showi'ng that the gradient of increase in both graphSi 
(i. ~.  the coefficients of the linear terms) is statistically highly  significant (P L  • 001). 
As regards the curvature (i.e.  the quadratic coefficient), for log (CPI),  it is highly sig-
nificant in both periods (P t:.. 001)  and significant but much less so as regards log (TGER) 
+  (.05 >  p  >  .01). 
Whil~ the ouadratic (i. e.  the curvature upwards) coefficient of log (  CPI) is 
larg~r in magnitude tn 1()58-1968 than i'n 1968-1974,  the difference is not statistically sig-
nificant ( P >  •  0!5).  The important point is that the propensity of the log ( CPI) graph to 
curl upwards around the linear trend was inherently as. emphatic in 1958-1968 as in 1969- i 
'1(}74. 
The truth is that the seeds of the present critical inflationary situation were 
: present long before thev became a matter of concern some two years ago.  Indeed the 
++ 
signs were unmistakable long before 1968. 
The appearance of inevitability of Chart 1 is no reason for despair.  Govern-
ments in other European countries have been successful in diminishing inflation in recent 
years. 
'* 
+ 
R. A.  Fish~r and F.  Yates: Statistical Tables for Biological,  Agricultural and Medical 
Research,  Oliver and Boyd,  1957.-
s~~ Appendix 7 for actual analysis. 
R. C.  Geary and J. L.  Pratschke,  op. cit.  The Central Ba·nk  and the NIEC also,  have 
for long be~n issuing warnings. - 11  -
Macro Aspects of Non-Employee Income 
Our major source here is the Central Statistics Office (  CSO)  annual series 
National Income and Expenditure (NIE).  In these reports values of certain macro series 
are estimated in current and constant prices.  Series so shown comprise (i) GDP at 
factor cost by 5 sectors of origin,  (ii) GDP at market prices in 7 categories.  Our main 
interest in these statistics is the implicit price indexes derived as the quotient of the 
cut"''ent value by the constant value. 
We must,  therefore, form some idea of what values at constant prices mean. 
Conceptually the values of the items at current prices are unique and well-defined,  though 
the~ are, of course, margt·ns of errors in their estimation.  Conceptual and practical 
diffJculties are rife in the estimation of the constant price series.  Sometimes more than 
ODE- value is conceivable; sometimes none at all,  though here it may be a case of the prac-
tical difficulties being insurmountable,  re·ndering necessary recourse to arbitrary price 
df'flators~  Even as regards aggregates: in NIE,  GD P at constant market prices as 
derived from the sectoral factor cost side is different from that from the expenditure 
side.  This conflict could not arise if  all elements of added value were estimated by the 
double deflation method.  This has proved practicable only in the case of the agricultural 
sector.  Services of publtc authorities were in general found by valuing number of 
emJioyees at base year remuneration: this means that labour productivity i"n  this sector is 
asnmed constant,  surely dubious in the light of increase in government activity. 
GP.Gerallv  speaking,  volume estimates in the two sectors Agriculture, forestrr, fishing 
and Industry are of better statistical quality than in the other three sectors which are 
practically all producing services (as distinct from goods).  Having entered this caveat 
(and in full sympathy with CSO),  in what follows we accept, without further comment on 
thll aspect,  the official estimates.  In principle we therefore assume that every current 
value flow is factorisable into price and quantity,  i.e. V = PQ,  even if this can be done in 
more than one way and if  the estimates of P and Q vary greatly in reliability*. 
* 
[Table  1.1) 
The unsatisfactory situation as regards statistical estimation of the volume of public 
llld other servicf's is a world phenomenon.  It has been proposed as a project for inves-
tlgat.ion by ESRI. - 1?  ~-
Table 1.1:  Unit costs of employee and Other income and consumer price index 1968-a974, 
with year 1968 as 100 
Consumer  Employee  Other income 
Year  price index  remuneration 
AFF  Non- AFF  Total 
l 
(2)  (1)  (2)  (2) 
1968  100  100  100  100  100  100  ; 
1969  ,107. 4  110.4  104.4  111.2  113.9  107.2 
1970  116.2  125.2  107.7  110.6  114.2  108.9 
1971  126.7  137.3  111.8  116.7  118.6  113.3 
1972  137.5  151.5  145.7  137.5  135.4  137.8 
1973  153.3  170.2  190.2  160.9  142.5  157.2 
1974  179.3  198.7  165.5  183.7  152.4  153.7 
Basic sources:  1968-1973 NIE 1973 
1974 - Review of 1974 and  Present Outlook - June 1975 
Notes 
(1)  Gross of stock appreciation; (2)  net of stock appreciation - see text.  1974 figure' 
for AFF is based on  current and  constant net output values of agriculture (alone), 
including stock changes. The NIE  Table A. 2 distinguishing remuneration of employees and Other income 
in five major sectors of origin at current market prices forms the basis of our macro 
approach.  In aggregate these are the main constituents of gra3s domestic product (GDP) 
at factor cost;  the only other constituents are the adjustment for stock appreciation,  (i.e. 
alteration of change in value of stock included in Other income to the national accounting 
definition value of volume change in stocks),  and provision for depreciation.  With the 
recent huge increase in wholesale prices this (negative) adjustment figure has become 
large and must be taken into account.  In the years 1972-74 this increase largely explains 
the·poor showing of cash flow compared with profits according to the accountancy 
definition.  To show the importance of the adjustment:  in 1973 Other income in  industry 
was  £195m.,  adjustment for stock ~ppreciation was £65m. or one-third of unadjusted 
Other income; the corresponding percentage for the sector Distribution,  Lraus port and 
communication was about one-sixth.  Unadjusted and adjusted concepts are used in 
Table 1. 2 and Chart 2 partly based on it. 
[chart  2_1 
All three graphs on Chart 2 are expressed per unit of real GDP  at factor cost 
in  Index number form.  The two graphs for Other income show that the adjustment was 
not important during the period 1958-1972 but assumed much significance in 1973 and 1974. 
Chart 2 shows that up to 1971 the gradient of increase of unit cost of Other 
income was far less steep than the unit cost of employee remuneration.  There was a 
sharp change in trend in  the Other income graph in 1972-1973,  so that in 1973 the index 
had practically reached the level of that of employee remuneration.  In 1974 there was 
clearly a falling away especially evident in the net graph.  This is probably one source 
of the depression of 1974-1975,  with its huge  increase in unemployment.  Dec is ions to 
change industrial output are made mainly by recipients of Other income,  ·.vho  .:.:c,  vf 
course,  influenced by factors other than trend in Other income. 
As it was well known that income experience in agriculture was very different 
from that in other sectors cit"!. ring the last three years it seemed des it· able to distinguish 
AFF from the rest of Other income in this study of unit costs.  Table 1.1 shows that AFF 
after being lower in unit cost (to base 1968) during the years 1969-1971,  unmistakably 
"took off" in 1972,  to reach a peak in 1973 far ahead of the index for Other income else-
where in the economy.  The severe fall  in 1974 still left AFF well abc  .. :c the net figure 
(2)  for unit cost of the rest of Other income. Chart  2  Unit cost of employee remunentioa and 11011-employee iacome  1958-1975 
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In a later chapter we shall show that prices of Irish agricultural products 
and materials are in the main outside the control of Irish farmers.  Irish farmers are 
"not to blame" for the trend in prices on which their incomes so largely depend.  None-
theless we must surmise that the great rise in the unit cost of Other income in AFF that 
began in 1972,  meaning for consumers a marked rise in the price of foodstuffs was a 
major contributory cause to the great rise in CPI and in the unit cost of employee 
remuneration -the latter two related, of course - in 1973 and 1974. 
So far our function has been simply to describe, not to analyse or to 
demonstrate cause-effect.  We certainly cannot infer, at this stage, that because the 
unit cost of labour is rising more rapidly than that of other incomes labour, is "more to 
blame" for inflation than the self-employed and profit earners.  It could happen that in 
two periods being compared with the same volume of output there was a change-over 
towards labour intensity, i.e. more labour and less tangible capital, or fewer employed 
but working harder and more skilfully (i.e. improved labour productivity),  or change in 
structure which certainly occurred. 
We are beginning to discern one of the major problems in this research: 
what are the quantity units of measurement in the context of the definition of price, "price 
is the value of a unit of product", the product being deemed to be reasonably homo-
geneous? 
[Table 1. 2 and Chart 3] 
Unit Costs in Five Broad Sectors 
In Table A. 2 of NIE net national product at current prices is displayed in 
five broad sectors each sub-classified into (a)  remuneration of employees and (b) other 
income.  In Table A. 4 output at constant (1968) prices is shown for the five sectors. 
Consequently we are enabled to produce for each sector the two unit cost indexes on 
exactly the lines already discussed for GDP as a whole.  The results are shown in Table 
2,  graphed on Chart 3.  Unfortunately, figures for later than 1973 are not estimable 
for non-agricultural sectors.* 
* Revised and updated unit cost indexes for the period 1969-1974 are presented in 
Appendix 9; the material for this appendix became available at a late stage of the 
research. - lf:  -
Table  1. 2:  .Unit cost indices for remuneration of employees and  ot~er income,  and implicit price indices 
Year 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
JQ7n 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
197?. 
_].973 
1958 
1959 
1960 
ho.i 
19C2 
1963 
1964 
J965 
1966 
1\:167 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
for gross domestic product (factor cost),  1958-1973, 
1968  as  100 
95.9 
89.5 
88.0 
86.2 
87.9 
88.4 
92.9 
103.7 
107.4 
100.1 
100 
110.3 
l~l. '3 
125.4 
129.2 
141  1 
74.7 
75.2 
73.3 
76.6 
78.4 
78.5 
88.3 
91.5 
86.8 
92.4 
100 
104.4 
107.7 
111.8 
145.7 
190  2 
76.0 
75.4 
n.e 
'tti. b 
iS  • .:; 
78.9 
87.8 
92.3 
89.2 
93.4 
100 
105.0 
! 
I 
i 
i 
' 
: 
Industry 
Distribution 
transport and 
communication 
Public 
administration 
and defence 
Remuneration of employees 
72.4 
I 
64.9  54.2 
71.1  66.5 
J  55.9 
72.7  I  68.3  58.9  ; 
75.3  72.0  '  61.8 
79.4  :  75.7  65.9 
81.8  77.0  70.0 
86.7  84.8  83.9 
88.7  88.2  ' 
87.9 
94.9  94.3  :  91.5 
96.4  97.5  92.7 
100  100  i  100 
109.7  106.5  ! 
10'.).5 
12~.0  117.6  I  ]2~. 2 
135.1  131. 1 
I 
141.1 
147.~ 
i  142.2  167.8 
158.5  156.4  196.1 
Other Income 
i 
I 
Other domestic 
(inc.  rent) 
52.9 
54.6 
57.5 
60.4 
65.5 
68.7 
78.1 
82.6 
88.5 
92. 8 
100 
110.6 
129.1 
141.4 
158,7 
185.2 
All 
Sectors 
62.1 
61.8 
63.8 
67.0 
71.6 
74.9 
82.4 
86.8 
92.8 
95.4 
100 
110.4 
125.2 
l:i7,3 
151.5 
170.2 
80.3  80.0  62.2  78.7 
78.1  92.1  62,6  81.4 
82. 9  94. 5  68. 6  82. 3 
86. 0  94. 5  70. 7  84. 2 
84. 4  96. 4  not  72. 6  84. 6 
84. 1  109. 8  applicable  76. 5  85. 6 
70.6  109.7  80.8  88.8 
82.9  113.9  83.8  92.2 
77. 8  107. 1  l  87. 1  88. 3 
95. 8  99. 6  I  94. 0  94. 5 
100  100  i  100  100 
110.6  117.7 
1
·  114.7  107.2 
111.9  123.3  112.2  108.9 
115. 6  127. 3  I  116. 8  113. 3 
142. 7  134. 1  I  128. 2  I  1:~7. 8 
12G. ·1 ___  __l~!-3_._1 -------+---=:14:!.:9::.!.•..!:::9  ___  t.:l-~_1:t.:5::.:7.!...  ~2-
Gross domestic product (factor cost) 
?i-.s--,---66-.  5-~r---5_;4.-2----,---55-.-4---r---66  ___  6_ 
71.0  70.7  55.7  57.3  67.6 
75.9 
7ll.f' 
82.1 
8:3. 1 
87.3 
91.5 
96.2 
100 
109.9 
75.9 
83.5 
89.0 
93.2 
95.  f) 
97.1 
100 
109.3 
58.~) 
Cl. 8 
65.9 
70. 1 
84.0 
87.9 
91.5 
92.7 
100 
109.5 
60.4  69.1 
67.1 
70.9 
7R. 2 
82.7 
87.5 
93.0 
100 
112.0 
'1'1...  0 
75.4 
78.2 
R~.9 
88.2 
90.7 
a4.s 
100 
109.2 
109.2  120.6  119.0  129.2  123.2  119.2 
113.3  130.7  130.2  141.1  132,8  128.3 
~:!: :  ~:::  ~  ---~~:! l __ l:_~  ~ ---'---~~  ~:!:: 
Basic Source:  1958-1~)64:  National Jncome and Expenditurt:,  1971.  l:)CB-1%7:  Nt1tiona1  Income and 
Expenditure,  1972.  19C8-1973:  National Income and  Expenditure,  1973. 
,Note_s:  Figures for  Other rncorne arc net of stock appreciation.  At the time of writing the latest NT F. 
availahle was that for 1973. C
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In the three non-AFF sectors for which comparison is possible,  in the 
period .1958-1973 the rise in wage cost has been much greater than is the case with Other 
income. 
All four non-agricultural wage unit costs have the same characteristics-
they always rise first slowly and much more steeply after 1968.  To the eye the employee 
remuneration (E) graphs for Public administration and defence and Other domestic are 
even more alike than any other pair.  This is borne out by the correlation coefficient 
between the 14 year-to-year changes in wage unit costs which is as high as • 96 compared 
with,  e. g. ,  • 86 for the c. c. between Public administration and defence and Industry wage 
unit cost changes.  The Other domestic sector, nearly a quarter of GD P at factor cost, 
obviously includes income of all services other than those in Transport etc.  and Public 
administration. 
The apparently excessive rise in Unit costs in Public administration and 
defence is subject to the qualification that in this sector volume output is measured for 
the most part by numbers engaged,  hence it is assumed that there has been little or no 
rise in productivity.  We can offer no opinion as to the plausibility or otherwise of this  .  -
assumption hence we do not know to what extent or dire~tion true unit costs differ from'~ 
those shown for this sector in Chart 2.  We can only recomme·nd that CSO develops 
statistics of volume output for Public administration and defence and other service sectors 
which (with some knowledge of the methodology) we add is easier said than done.  See 
also remarks and footnote on page 5. * 
The Concept of Price of Other Income 
The difficult problem of pricing Other income may be approached from a 
somewhat different angle.  So far we have been content to derive unit cost indexes for 
employee compensation and other income by dividing current values of each by constant 
price values of GDP,  thus preserving the current value proportionately of each.  Here 
we try to regard employee compensation as businessmen regard it,  a cost like any other. 
An Example.  A cabinet-maker with an employee makes a single product- say,  tables~ 
always to exactly the same design.  In quantum,  materials renuired are always the same; 
*  Precise definitions of the sectors shown in Table 1. 2 will be found in NIE 1973, 
pp.  40-41. - 19  -
for simplicity we assume a single material, timber.  The following illustration shows how 
price of Other income is calculated in period 2 compared to period 1.  The actual price of 
a table (over which the cabinet-maker has no control) is £6.5 in period 1 and £7.15 in 
period 2. 
Period 1  Price Index  Period 2 
£  £ 
1.  Timber  2.600  1.12  2.91200 
2.  Emp.  remun.  1.625  1. 09  1.77125 
3.  Other income  2.275  p  2.46675 
----- ·---~~-_  ...  -
4.  Total  6. 500  1.10  7.15000 
The prices of items 1 and 4 are unambiguous.  As regards 2,  the hourly rate has increased 
in the ratio 1: 1.1227 but because of an increase of labour productivity of 3 per cent the 
employee cost embodied in a table 'increased by the 9 per cent shown (1. 09 = 1.1227/1. 03). 
The price index required is then 
p  = 2. 46675/2. 275 = 1. 084 
To link the example with what follows we should point out that this exemplifies 
only the Laspeyres (earlier weighting) approach.  Actually Laspeyers and Paasche give 
identical figures here. 
The Algebra of Double Deflation* 
Price, as commonly understood, is a gross concept.  Thus,  the products 
(goods or services) of a firm each have a unique price per conventional unit; so have the 
various non-factor inputs.  The difference between the values of products and of non-factor 
inputs is the added value,  i.e.  a net value.  The price and quantum of added value are real-
isable concepts (i.e.  v = PQ,  as always),  apart from statistical difficulties, but they cannot 
be validly derived without the intennediacy of prices of products and materials, i.e. gross 
prices.  In fact let Vi and v1 be the current value of output and value of input respectively 
* We hope that this algebraic interlude will not seem intrusive.  It is very simple; one of 
the authors was involved in its development; and it is the easiest way of introducing a 
subtle economic argument. - ?0  -
in period i and V  .j and vi. the values of quantities in period i at period j  prices.  Let a. be 
1  J  1 
added value so that,  at current prices,  ai =  V.  - v..  Let there be two periods 1 and 2. 
1  1 
Then-
a1  = V  1 - v  1: a2 = V  2 - v  2. 
But also defin.:.•  a .. as follows -
1] 
a12 = V12- v12; a21  ==V21- v21 
Then 
P' = a12/a1; P" = a2/a21 
where P' is the Laspeyres and  P" the Paasche price index.  Similarly for the quantum 
indexes-
Q' =a  /a • Q" =a /a  21  1'  2  12 
Grant~d the logic of the classical Laspeyres and  Paasche formulae,  one can scarcely con-
ceive of any other approach to the factorisation o( added value than that indicated, which is 
termed the double deflation method.  This necessarily involves gross prices.  Note that 
the various indexes behave statistically as they should: for instance the classical result that 
the product of Laspeyres price by Paasche - quantum and vice versa is the value index. 
Thus 
P' Q" ::.'!  P'' Q' :~a /a •  2  1 
Actual Calculation of Price of Oth~r Income 
W  P  now use the GD P accounting identity -
GDP =Domestic demand + exports - imports 
=Employee remuneration +Other income (after adjustment for stock 
appreciation) +provision for depreciation+ taxes on expenditure-
subsidies. 
GDP is at market prices; domestic demand includes government as well as personal expen-
diture and capital expenditure.  All flows except the two income flows on the right are gross 
and hence uniquely priceable; in fact in NIE  constant (1968) price series are given for all so 
that their average annual prices in index form are derivable as the quotient of current by 
constant price value. 
\Ve propose to find the price index between consecutive years for Other income 
bv  regarding the identity as an equation for determining the only unknown,  namely, the price - 21  -
of Other income. 
In index number making we price an identical "basket'' of goods and services 
(i.e. identical in quantities) at the prices ruling in the periods of comparison 1 and 2,  the 
Laspevres or Paasche indexes being the quotients of the two figures.  Treating employee 
compensation as a cost raises the thorny question of the unit to be used in pricing paid 
labour.  In the cabinet making example we priced labour as per unit of output.  While we 
prefer this concept, we admit that a case could be made for pricing as per hour.  in the 
interest of "no change'' in quanta in the periods of comparison.  In Tables 1. 3 and 1. 4 we 
calculate year-to-year price indexes of Other income using the per unit of output concepi s 
only for the price of employee remuneration. 
{!able  1. 3] 
In 'fable 1. 3 we give the actual working of the unit cost (price) of other income 
according to the ideas in this paragraph1  for 1968 to base 1967 as unity. 
From the Note to Table 1. 3 it is obvious that P' is the Laspeyres,  and  P" the 
Paaache,  price index,  P the .Fisher Ideal.  Actually the values of P' and P'
1 are almost 
identical here and between eve-ry pair of years - see Table 1. 4. 
In appearing to deflate GD P (flagrantly a new flow)  by a single index we :::nay be 
thought to have infringed the ru1e that only gross values are conceptually priceable.  This is 
not so.  As we have carefully checked,  the CSO  implicit deflator of GDP is an exact syn-
thesis of five gross flows: personal expenditure,  government expenditure, GDFCF,  exports 
and minus imports. 
Year-to-Year Changes in Price of Other Inco~ 
We give all these year-to-year price (unit cost) indexes in column 1 of Table 1. 4 
in which two other versions of non-employee income prices are given as well. 
\!able 1. 4J 
Table 1. 4 shows that, while the three Other income price series are perceptibly 
different they all sustain the proposition that the non-employee cost increases were generally 
less than the employee remuneration increases.  Indeed,  as the cumulative indexes show, T
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Table 1. 4:  Three estimates of unit cost of Other Income; unit cost of employee remunera-
tion; consumer price index.  Previous year as 100. 
Other Income  Employee remuneration  Consumer Price Index 
Year 
1  2  3  4  5 
195q  107.9  103.4  103.7  99.6  100.0 
1960  97.4  101.0  101.7  103.1  100.4 
1961  102.5  102.3  103.0  105.0  102.7 
1q62  100.4  100.5  100.9  106.9  104.2 
1q63  q9.6  101.3  101.1  104.6  102.0 
1964  110.2  103.7  106.0  110.0  106.7 
1965  102.9  103.8  101. 8  105.4  105.0 
1q66  <)6. 6  95.9  97.4  106.9  103.0 
1Q67  105.7  106. q  106.2  102.8  103.2 
1168  102.0  10fl.q  107.8  104.8  104.7 
1~6q  101. q  107.3  106.1  110.4  107.4 
1q70  99.9  101. 6  101. 1  113.5  108.2 
1971  111.1  104.0  105.0  109.6  109.0 
1972  122.3  121. 6  123.4  110.3  108.6 
1973  120.1  114.1  120.3  112.4  111.4 
1158-
1(}68*  127.3  127. 0  133.3  161.1  137.4 
1968-
]173+  166.1  1fi7. 2  167.2  170.2  153.3 
1q58-
1973*  211.F5  19<).7  222.9  274.2  210.6 
* 19f\8 as 100.  + 1968 as 100 
Basic Sourc~='s:  National Income and Expenditure 1973 Tables A. 2-A. 6 Irish Statistical 
Bulletin. December 1974. 
Notes 
Column 1:  Using the method illustrated in Table 1. 3. 
Column 2:  based on Table 1.2.  (the numerator is Other Income net of stock apprecia-
tion,  the denominator GDP  at constant factor cost. 
Column 3:  Similar to Column 2,  but with Other Income gross of stock appreciation 
as numerator. 
Column 4:  based on Table 1. 2 
Column 5:  the figure for each year is based on an average of quarterly observations. - 2t1  -
they were quite close to the CPI,  at the later period 1968-1973.  Other income price 
seems to have strengthened its position  vis -a - vis  employee income  price in 1968-1972 
compared with the earlier 1958-1968. 
The outstanding feature of Table 1. 4 is perhaps the upsurge in the price of 
Other income in 1H72.  From Table 1. 2 this rise is obviously due to Agriculture, foreattry, 
fishing for which we find that unit cost of Other income rose by 30 per cent, compared with 
2~ per cent for industry,  5 per cent for distribution etc. and 10 per cent for other domestic. 
Ceteris paribus we might have eJpected a negative relationship between year-
to-year rises in costs of employee remuneration and costs of Other income, i.e. that. a rise 
in one was at the expense of the other.  This does not seem to be the case.  In fact the 
correlation between columns 2 and 4 of Table  1.  4  is r  =  • 37,  not s ignlficantly different from 
zero with 12 d. f.  but giving no indication of negative relationship. 
Conclusion from Chapter 1 
The main indicator of inflation,  the CPI,  has been increasing at an accele-rat-
ing rate sine~ 1968 (Chart 1).  The tendency of the quarterly CPI graph to curl upwards 
was much the same in the later pE:·riod  1969-1~74 as in 1958-1958.  Inflationary pressure 
has been latent for a long term of years. 
'While unit cost of Other income (gross) was closer to that of employee remune-
ration <luring the period 1969-197t1 than in the earlier period 1958-1968,  over the whole 
period 1958-·1974 the general picture is emphatically of a greater advance of the unit cost 
of employee remuneration (Chart 1).  Table 1.1 shows that in the period 1958-1974 unit 
cost of employee remuneration increased considerably more,  and unit cost of Other income 
(net of stock appreciation) considerably less,  than the CPl. 
We think that much significance attaches to the change ~n unit costs in AFF and 
non-AFF (Table 1.1) in the single year 1973-1974 as an explanation of the onAet of depress-
ion.  Vlhile the CPI and employee r~muneration unit cost both rose by  17 per cent, Other 
fn:)ome unit cost (net of stock appreei.at1on) in ArF fell by  13 per cent (though fron1 a high 
level in 1973) and in non··AFF rose by only 7 per cent.  As to what followed in 1975-1976 
Wf' nef~d only remark that the level of' activity (hence of en1ployn1ent) in the non-Ali'F private 
sector df~pends largely on the decision of recipients of Othe·r income. - ?';  -
Chart 3,  based on Table 1. 2,  shows that in major non-AFF sectors over 
the whole period 1958-1973, unit cost of Other income lagged far behind that of employee 
compe·nsation.  This was also true of the period 1968-1973 except in the case of Distribu-
tion etc. 
Attention is directed to the new approach for pricing of Other income the 
rP.sults of which are given in colum·n 1 of Table 1. 4.  We would like to have the comments 
of our colleagues on this approach. - '?7  -
Chapter 2.  The Agricultural Sector as a Source of Inflation 
While,  as will have been seen from the last column of Appendix 1, gross 
agricultural prices rose considerably in 1973 (and such increase contributed to the accele-
ration of inflation in Ireland),  this price rise was a world phenomenon.  More than half of 
Ireland's agricultural output in 1P73 was exported.  Now,  as always,  home agricultural 
prices are dominated by export prices.  Commodities of which Irish farmers can "make" 
prices are, we believe,  few and their value comparatively small.  Fresh vegetables may 
be a case in point- see Chapter 3,  but even here there can be no question of monopoly: 
price collusion is untypical of agricultural markets.  Anyway,  any vestiges of internal 
price control are sure to vanish under the CAP of the EEC. 
We made the point earlier that more than half of Other income arises in 
agriculture, which accordingly merits separate consideration.  We first deal with the price 
aspect; after that,  in very general terms, with income formation in recent years.  We have 
also insisted that in all sectors the level of Other income depends largely on prices (as dis-
tinct from quanta) of products and materials.  This is specially true of agriculture for which 
the volume of net output has i'ncreased very slowly both in the long and short term.  Thus 
the volume of net output increased by only 13 per cent in the period 1968-1974 compared 
with 38 per cent in gross output manufacturing industry. 
(Table 2.1 and Chart 4  ] 
The outstanding feature of Chart 4 is the vast increase in price of materials 
(as defined in Notes to Table 2.1) in 1974.  This is specially significant in view of the prop-
ortionately greater increase over the years in quantum of materials purchased tllan in quan-
tum of gross output: 25 per cent and 15 per cent respectively between 1968 and 1974; over 
the longer term 1953-1974,  the percentages were 189 and 58.  This phenome·non marks the 
transition of Irish agriculture more towards a cash,  and away from a subsistence,  economy, 
a phenomenon which will usually make farmers more vulnerable in an inflationary situation. 
The new index of price of net output (defined in Notes to Table 2.1) gives a 
more meaningful view of the agricultural pric~ situation than does that of gross output.  In 
effect it nets out the vast increase in the price of materials between 1973 and 1974 when the 
Consumer Price In.dex was increasing by 17 per cent.  Little to wonder at the agitation of 
the farming community and their representatives in 1974 ! Year 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
- ?'l  -
Table 2.1:  Agricultural price indexes and Consumer Price Index,  1969-74 
1968 as 100 
Agricultural prices  I 
Consumer prices 
Gross output  Materials  Net Output  j 
104.7  101.8  105.6  107.4 
109.9  106.3  110.8  116.2 
116.3  114.9  116.7  126.7 
138.8  121.5  144.4  137.5 
176.·2  155.8  182.9  153.3 
180.7  208.7  171.0  179.3 
Basic sources:  ISB  (June issues):  "Review of 1974 and Present Outlook" 
AlL  agricultural price indexes have been derived from the identity 
P = V  /Q,  indexes V (value) and Q (quantum) being given.  Accordingly,  price indexes 
for gross output (i.e. of sales off farms and consumption in farm households,  hence 
ignoring inter-farm transactions) and materials (only feeding stuffs,  fertilisers and 
seeds purchased) differ slightly from cfficial indexes.  The net output price index 
is new.  n is derived as the quotient of value of net output (i.e. gross output less 
materials as defined above) by quantum of net output (i.e. gross output less materials, 
each at constant prices).  See text and Chart 4.  Gross and net output include 
changes in livestock numbers. 
"Materials",  as defined,  does not explicitly include petrol,  oil etc.  though 
the enormous increase in prices thereof probably was partly responsible for the price 
rise in ''materials"·  If petrol,  oil etc. were included in materials,  we calculate that 
the price index of materials would have been 213.1 (compared with 208.7 in Table 2.1) 
in 197  4 and the price index of net output 168. 7 (instead of 171. 0). Chart 4 : Agricultural price indexes 1969-1974, 1968 as 100 
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We conclude this brief study of prices by the generality that, contrary 
to the popular opinion outside agriculture up to 1974, prices have not particularly 
favoured Irish farmers. 
The last column of Table 2. 2  (p.  25)  shows that the marked expansion 
first recorded in 1972 was short-lived; the fall in 1974 in average real income amounted 
to one-fifth.  As happened so often in the past in Ireland,  the improvement in average 
real income (i.e. in purchasing power) during 1968-1974 was mainly due to fall in 
.manpower.  In fact, at 1968 prices the real value of farmers' income arising in 1974 
(£358 million at current prices - see Table 2. 2 - deflated by CPI) was £200 million, 
an advance of merely 7 per cent on the actual 1968 value (£187 million),  compared 
with a decline in manpower in agriculture of 18 per cent. 
From another angle: it has been noted that in advanced economies 
there is a marked tendency towards equality in broad sectors of the economy in the 
statistic average income per person engaged,  in particular in those two broadest 
sectors (1) agriculture and (2) rest of the economy,  though it is relevant to remark 
that these have a far lower proportion of their labour force in agriculture than 
Ireland has.  This is,  of course,  what one would expect,  granted long-term 
mobility in the working population, i. e.  away from poor sectors and towards better 
sectors.  It is known that, by this test,  the Irish economy falls well short of 
"advanced" - see columns 8 and 9 Table 12  of ERI Paper No.  16~  Have agricul-
turalists improved their relative position in recent years? 
The ratios of earned income per head of persons at work in (1) 
AFF and (2) rest of the economy in the years specified were as follows:-
*  E. A.  Attwood and R. C.  Geary:  "Irish County Incomes in 1960",  ERI Paper No. 
16,  1963  shows that the discrepancy between average farm and non-farm em-
ployee income is due to the situation in the west and north-west of the country. - 3l -
Year  Ratio 
1958  57 
1968  59 
1972  65 
1973  74 
1974  61 
TbPSP figures are probably too low because (1) farmers pay little direct taxation so that, 
on this account alone,  the ratios for disposable income should be larger, (2)  consumption 
of own  produce without process of sale, valued in NIE  at farm prices,  should be values at 
retail prices.  Obviously,  other corrections (e. g.  for subsidies) should be made to obtain 
"true" ratios.  Such correction would be onerous and, we think,  unnecessary for the pre-
sent purpose, which is merely to establish trend. 
While there was a real improvement in the relative position of agricultur-
ists up to 1  <)73,  there was a severe setback in 1974,  leaving them but little better than they 
were in 1  <)58.  Indications are that there has been an improvement ln 1975.  Even so, 
the "advanced economy" ratio of unity still seems remote. 
Cl)nclusion as to Agriculture 
Thf' great rise in agricultural prices in recent years has been a major com-
ponent of inflation,  directlv in food  prices, indirectly in the effect on incomes of the rise in 
the CPl.  However, we can find ·no  evidence that Irish agriculture,  in general, was in a 
oosition in recent years to influence its income level through price adjustment.  In the year 
1974 when inflation in Ireland can really be said to have got out of hand, farmers were more 
the victims of inflation than the creators thereof. 
This conclusion is about agriculture in general.  Had we time, we would 
try to analyse the data by farm size, region,  product etc.  As is well knOWI;l,  average in-
comes vary greatlv in such separate "cells".  These analyses could not be sufficiently up-
to-date,  as we have insisted above -the year 1974 was crucial- but,  with a good deal of 
knowledge of these aspects in the past,  we surmise,  with confidence,  that groups in anything 
llke a quasi-monopolistic position would be insignificant. 
In our final chapter we resume discussion of the problem of inflation ln 
agriculture. - ~' -
Table 2.2:  Transition from output to income of agriculture.  1968-19?'4 
Year  Gross  Specified  Other  Subsidies  Income  arising  Total per person 
output  materials  expenses 
Total  Employee Other  at work (£) 
Actual  Real 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
£million,  current 
1968  304  67  52  I  2  187  19  168  603  603  I 
1969  319  73  59  I  4  191  20  171  641  597  I 
I 
I 
1970  344  82 
! 
66  i  7  203  21  182  I  717  617 
I  1971  388  95  i  77  9  225  25  200  I  824  650 
I  I 
1972  480  102 
I  87 
I  12  303  27  276  I 1,135  825  I 
i 
j 
i  I 
1973  625  145  l  100  14  394  29  365  I  1,515  989  i 
I 
I 
1974  634  175 
I 
101  358  35  323  1,409  786 
Basic sources:  Same as Table 1.1 
Note 
Our presentation differs slightly from the official one in that we have included the small 
amount of land annuities (about £3 million throughout) in column 4,  instead of in column 
6.  (Data for 1974 are preliminary and contain a few speculative elements of our own) 
Other expenses (column 4) included rates,  repairs, petrol etc.,  depreciation,  transport 
and marketing,  land annuities etc.  Deflator for column 10 is CPI,  assumed therefore to 
apply to agricultural income,  and only approximately true. - 3?.  -
Chapter 3.  Retail Trade 
Census of Distribution Data 
An important source of non-wage income is retail trade,  and the Census 
of Distribution (CD)  is the most important source of data in relation thereto.  The last 
two complete CD's were for the years 1956 and 1966.  While these are remote in date they 
are by no means irrelevant for our study,  for it will be recalled that in the postwar period 
inflation was always in evidence; if not at the present galloping rate at least at a smart trot. 
In fact,  between 1956 and 1966 the Consumer Price Index increased by 38 per cent,  equi-
valP.Dt to a compound rate of 3. 3 per annum. 
The 1966 Situation 
We begin with an examination of the data for 1966 alone.  These data con-
sist of (1)  sales,  f2) gross margtn,  (3)  employee compensation, (  4) net margin =  (2) less 
(3),  and (5) number of persons engaged i'n the categories (a) employees, (b) family workers. 
Gross margin is sales minus purchases plus changes in stock between end and beginning of 
year.  WhilP net margin is the most relevant of these statistics for our purposes it should 
bP pointed out that these totals contain many supplementary costs as well as income of 
famllv membPrs.  One must also recall that this income includes much that is of a similar 
nature to incomP from emplovment; it is therefore much more than a return to capital. 
The supplementary. costs include turnover tax and wholesale tax in 1966,  rent, rates, 
advertislng, wrapping matE-rial etc, which together are substantial.  Our main object will 
bE>  to compare derived data for 1956 and 1966 and  such comparisons between net margin 
raties may be valid as approximating to what would be found by using non-wage incomes if 
these were available.  Of course a constant net margin on  turnover does not imply that 
therE" has been ·no  change in the rate of return on the retailer's capital unless we assume 
that the ratio between the value of his sales and that of his capital has remained unchanged. 
CD  provides at the national level a twofold classification (1} by description 
of wsiness and (2)  size (number of persons engaged).  As to (2),  we have reduced the 
clabes to three,  1-4,  5-q, 10+. - ~4 -
Table 3. 1.  Major statistics for retail trade in Ireland in 1966,  in three sizes of business 
classes, (1) actual values, (2)  corrected for different type of business 
structure. 
Size  100GM/S  100W/S  100NM/S  100W/GM  GM/P (£)  W/N (£) 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
(1)  Actual 
1-4  I  1<).5  4.8  14.7  24.6  549  374 
5-C)  20.8  8. 6  12.2  41.3  893  472 
10+  22.5  10.3  12.2  45.7  1,248  581 
All  siz~s  21.1  I  8. 1  13.0  38.3  846  501 
(2)  Corrected for structure 
1-4  20.fi  5.3  15.2  26.1  605  394 
5-Q  21.0  8. 8  12.2  41.6  890  476 
10+  22.1  10. 3  11.8  46.2  1,041  558 
All sizes  21. 1  8. 1  13.0  38.3  846  501 
Raslc source:  CD  1 'l66 
Notation:-
S =Sales 
GM = Gross margin = Sales minus purchases plus increases in stock. 
W = Employee compensation. 
NM  =Net margin= GM- W. 
P = Number of persons engaged = number of employees plus number of 
fa  mil  v workers. 
N = Number of employees. 
Siz~ in column (1)  r~lates to number of persons engaged (P) 
Corrected series (2) are found by reweighting size functions for each des-
cription of business by totals for all sizes, i.e. each size is similarly weighted.  The 
weights are the denominators of the functions,  i.e. S for columns 2 - 4,  CM for column,  5 
P for column 6,  N for column 7. 
Column 4 = Column 2 less Column 3. The only comparisons that can be made in Table 3.1 are those between 
different sizes of retail outlets.  But here comparison may be affected by the different 
sizes of different descriptions of business; for instance on  average clothing firms are 
larger than groceries.  Series (2)  are accordingly provided to show what the functions 
would have been if all sizes were weighted alike, i.e.  each given the weight pertaining to 
all sizes of firm of a given description.  The table shows that these corrections are sig-
nificant,  generally in the direction of lessening the contrast between different sizes.  The 
following comment is based on series ( 2). 
As size increases so does the gross margin ratio (column 2).  The wage 
ratio fcolumn 3) increases steeply mainly because the proportionate number of employees 
to total engaged increases with size; in 1966 uncorrected percentages for family workers in 
relatlon to all engaged were 63. C)  for size 1-4,  21.9 for 5-9,  1. 7 for 10+,  reflecting the 
tendencv for shops to become limited companies with increasing size, whereby nearly all 
oersons engagf'rl become employees, net margin providing interest and  profit for share-
holCJers,  not normally working in the business. 
Of most importance from the present point of view is to note (column 4 (2)) 
that the net margin function decreases with increasing size.  Still,  column 5 suggests that 
even when firms are large,  emplovee compensation tends towards about one-half of gross 
margin,  a conclusion borne out by the more refined classification by size and description 
of business. 
Column 6 indicates the great increase in efficiency with increasing size, 
which probably results in much improved pay rates.  The conclusions of this section are 
not materially affected by the absence of a collection for purchase taxes (see be  low). 
This study of Table 3. 1 makes it important to have regard to the trend 
in size of retail outlets. 
Comparison of 1C)56  and 1966 
A difficulty arises in that the 1966 retail sales and  hence gross and net 
marq'lns included turnover tax and wholesale tax,  the 1956 data being free of such imposi-
tions.  For reasons given in Appendix 2 the effect of the wholesale tax was ignored and the - ~6 -
1966 data corrected for the effect of the 2l per cent turnover tax assumed to apply equally 
to all descriptions of business and levied on retail value inclusive of turnover tax.  No 
correction was made for "old" indirect taxes o·n  drink,  tobacco,  petrol,  rates etc.  levied 
in both 1  q 56 and 1966 which were not remitted by the retailer,  and hence not included in 
gross or net margins, though it is recognised that different incidence in the two years might 
affect comparisons of functions like 100 GM/S.  Data are not available for making correc-
tions for ''old" taxes. 
[Table 3.2] 
The only correction made was to subtract 2~ per cent of sales in 1966 
from sales, gross and net margins and recalculate the functions involving these data, for 
comparison with the actual functions for 1956. 
One of the most significant showings of Table 3. 2 is that (comparing 
columns 3 and  4 for the S percentage) outlets are becoming larger, though the smallest 
are holding their own.  An  examination of descriptions of business shows that this ten· 
dency is most marked for Groceries (percentage in size 10+ increasing from 16. 6 to 32.1) 
and is practically confined thereto.  We  find in fact that,  on elimination of Groceries, the 
corresponding corrected percentage for size 10+ increased only from 47. 6 to 50.1.  This 
increase in size must lead to greater efficiency if not,  unfortunately,  to a lowering of the 
1 00 GM/S statistic - again see columns 3 and 4. 
At  this point we must remind ourselves that this section is not an analysis 
of the l~wel and trend of retail trade.  The analysis was undertaken to ascertain to what 
Pxtent non-employee income in this sector was responsible for inflation. 
To turn to inflation,  one of its major evils is said to be that it weakens the 
opposition of customers to price rises.  If this were so,  one would expect to fi'nd,  during 
a period of inflation (in our case 1956 to 1966),  a significant increase in relative mark-up 
in net margin (i.e. NM)  our proxy for non-employee income or- a possibility we are un-
able to Pxamine - a failure to pass o·n  to consumers improvements in the value-capital to 
sales ratio. 
Nothing of the kind can be inferred from Table 3. 2.  The column 3 and 
column 4 "all sizes" figures 100 NM/S and 100 NM/GM are practically identical, if  with 
small decreases for the two smaller sizes and increases for the largest size. - 1.7  -
Table  3. 2:  Major statistics for  retail trade in Ireland in 1956 and 1966 in three size of business classes, 
( 1)  actual values,  (2) 1956 separate description of business functions reweighted by 1966 weights. 
1956 data with 
Change 
Slze  1956  1966 
1966 weights  Total  Structure  Internal 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
S percentage 
1-4  35.5  34.5  33.9  -I. 6  -1.0  -o. 6 
5-9  25.9  25.3  19.9  -6.0  -o. 6  -5.4 
10 +  38.5  40.2  46.1  +7. 6  +1. 7  +5.9 
All sizes  100  100  100  - - -
100 GM/S 
1  - 4  17.4  18.0  17.4  o. 0  +0. 6  -o. 6 
5 ..  9  17.4  18.6  18.8  +1.4  +1. 2  +0.2 
10 +  19.8  19.8  20.5  +0. 7  o. 0  +0. 7 
All sizes  18.2  19.0  19.1  +0.9  +0. 8  +0.1 
100 NM/S 
1-4  13.0  13.4  12.5  -o. 5  +0.4  -o. 9 
5-9  9. 8  10.4  9. 9  +0.1  +0. 6  -o. 5 
10  +  9. 1  9. 2  9. 9  +0.8  +0.1  +0. 7 
All sizes  10.7  10.9  10.8  +0.1  +0.2  -0.1 
100 NM/GM 
1-4  74.8  74.3  71.8  -3.0  -o. 5  -2.5 
5•9  56.2  55.9  53.1  -3.1  -o. 3  -2.8 
10 +  46.8  46.4  48.5  +1. 7  -0.4  -2.1 
All sizes  58.7  56.9  56.6  -2.1  -1.8  -o. 3 
GM/P (£) 
1-4  265  268  479  +214  +3  +211 
5-9  450  457  786  +336  +7  +329 
10 +  633  641  1,109  +476  +8  +468 
All sizes  402  427  745  +343  +25  +318 
W/N (£) 
1-4  201  206  374  +173  +5  +168 
5 ..  9  254  266  472  +218  +12  +206 
10 +  346  355  581  +235  +9  +226 
All sizes  278  295  501  +223  +17  +206 
Basic Source:  CD  1956 and  1966. 
~otes:  (See over) - ~8  -
Notes to Table 3. 2 
For notation (S  GM  etc) see Table 3. 1 
Most of the column 4 figures differ from the similarly described 
figures in Table 3.1 because the Table 3. 2 figures have been corrected for the 
effects of the 2!% turnover tax of 1966.  This correction reduced the originalS 
and hence GM  and NM by • 0258,  leaving W,  P  and N unchanged. 
The column 3 figures show what the 1956 functions would be if the 
absolute values of S,  GM,  P  and N were those of 1966.  They are the most useful 
data for comparison with those of column 4 
Col.  5 = Col.  4 - Col.  2 
Col.  6 = Col.  3 - Col.  2 
Col.  7 = Col.  4 - Col.  3 
The reweighting undertaken in Table 3. 2 has a different object to that 
in Table 3.1.  For the classes 1-4,  5-9,  10+,  the adjusted figures are obtained by 
reweighting the observations in 1956 for a given class size over all business descriptions, 
using the weight appropriate to the description and class in 1966. 
The adjusted All sizes figure is obtained by reweighting (using the 
appropriate 1966 "all sizes" weights) the three revised figures of the previous paragraph. - ~q -
In fact,  in general the table gives a strong impression of regularity. 
Again compating columns 3 and  4,  the percentage increases in the efficiency ratios for GM/P 
are  very similar in the three size groups.  As regards W  /N, there was a tendency for 
average employee compensation to increase percentage-wise more for small shops than 
large, a natural tendency towards equalization in view of the low pay in small shops in 1956. 
For all sizes the adjusted or 'internal' i'ncrease ln GM/P was 74 per cent, 
ve-rv close to the 70 per cent 'internal' increase for average employee compe·nsation W  /N. 
But, as indicate-d earlier,  the Consumer Price Index advanced by  only 38 per cent.  Is there 
evidence of undue inflationary pressure here? 
Let sales (S} in 1956 and 1966 be s1 and s2 respectively with numbers 
engaged respectively P 1 and  P 2•  Let the unitary retail price index (to base 1956 as 1) be 
p.  Then one measure of (persons engaged) productivity 7'  is:-
Bv this criterion if':":  = 1,  then output per person must have remained unchanged; if  'H '71, 
it must have increased,  and vice versa if  i6 <  1.  Using uncorrected figures for s2 (i.e. 
inclusive of 2l per cent turnover tax) we  find~  ::: 1. 31. 
If  we assume that the unitary index of gross margin per person engaged of 
1. 74 is price-deflatable by the unitary Consumer Price Index of 1. 38 (incorrect strictly 
speaking but probably near enough to the truth for the present purpose),  the real increase 
in UDitary gross margin per person was 26 per cent (1. 26  ===  1. 74/1. 38),  hence less than ~ • 
The a·nswer to the question posed at the end of the second last paragraph is in the negative. 
During the lnterval 1956 to 1966 compensation of either employees or family workers in 'the 
rPtall sPctor was not inflationary. 
It is true that the foregoing calculation, based on productivity, has in it 
elements of tautology,  the two sides of the calculation simply repeating the regularities of 
comparison in Table 3. 2.  But,  even without the productivity calculation,  one could rely 
on the regularity alone to argue that retailers were concerned only to maintain these regu-
larities (percentage marks-up and the like) during a period of price and wage increase, 
though of course less than in more recent years. - tlO  -
The Annual Inquiry into Retail Trade by the Central Statistics Office 
provides estimates on a sample basis of the sales, and of the ratio of gross margin 
to sales, of retailers.  These estimates are available for the period 1967-1970 only. 
After a draft of this chapter had been prepared, summary results of the 1971 Census 
of Distribution were published.  Table 3. 3 is based on these two sources. 
Table 3. 3.  Sales and Ratio of Gross Margin to Sales 1966-1971. 
Sales (£ million)  Increase in Sales (%)  Gross Margin:Salcts  (%) 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
1966  473.76  - 19.1 
1967  510.24  7.7  19.3 
1968  564.32  10.6  19.0 
1969  624.71  10.7  19.6 
1970  682.81  9..3  18.7 
1971  758.51  11.1  20.0 
-- -- -- -· 
1966-1971 Average  - 9.9  19.3 
'd' 
Basic Sources: 1966, 1971 CD 
1967-197  0 ISB December 197 2. 
' ... 
Notes 
The estimates of sales in the years 1967-1970 are obtained by applying the percen-
tage change in sales of sample respondents to the 1966 CD  figure for sales (including 
sales of CD non-respondents).  The ratio of gross margin to sales is adjusted for the 
turnover tax,  included in reported gross margins in 1971 only,  allows for the effect 
of CD non-respondents. 
In interpreting the figures in column (3)  it should be rem-
embered that the absence of a correction for wholesale tax receipts included in gross 
margins is more serious in the years 1967-1971 than in 1966 (the tax was introduced 
at 5% on 1st October 1966),  and particularly so in 1970 and 1971  (the tax was doubled 
to 10% on 1st May 1970).  (See Appendix 2). 
It appears that there has been Little change between 1966 
and 1971 in the ratio of gross margin to sales, and that the trend of the period 1956-
1966 has continued. - 41  -
Conclusion as to Retail Trade 
ThP pE-riod we deal with is rather remote,  even though an effort has 
bPPn made cursorily to bring it up to the latest CD  year,  1971. 
Thf' st.rongE>st impression this section of the research has left on us is 
that retailers have actf'd to oreserve their more-or-less traditional percentage marks-up 
which would imply that littlf' attemot, if  any,  was made to take advantage of inflation,  in 
particular to usf' the lowering of consumer resistance to increase these percentage mar-
gins.  Of coursP,  the period was one of comparatively mild inflation and it may be argued 
that it is only when prices increase frequently is consumer resistance lowered appreciably. 
A point we have not mad  is that,  to the benefit of the consumer, retail-
tog is a very competitive sector, with many outlets for most descriptions of business. - 4~ -
Chapter 4.  Group and Individual Retail Prices 
Th~re is some relation between price and Other income.  At  any rate 
a comparatively large advance in selling price of product constitutes a prima facie case 
for investigation of undue profit obtained.  Detailed information on Other income is woe-
fully  d~ficient, as will by now be clear,  and statistics with even only tenuous connection 
with our main topic must be examined for any glimmer of light they may afford.  It is in 
this spirit that we present the following short analysis of retail prices. 
Group Prices 
The idea in Table 4.1 is to identify the commodity groups (if any) which, 
from time to time,  pushed the CPI upwards.  We  should emphasize that absolute figures 
depend on  the base period chosen, here the official CSO base November 1968.  However, 
the figures in each column show the periods in which each group exercised most inflation-
ary pressure, without regard to the importance of the group.  A remarkable feature of 
each group series is that (with few exceptions) its period of effect (i.e. with percentages 
significantly different ·}rom 100) tends to be continuous and not dispersed,  e. g. when the 
\ 
Tobacco percentage reached the seventies in IV 19 72,  it stayed there ever since. 
[Table 4. ~1 
In point of weighting and psychological effect, the showing of the Food 
group is by far the most significant.  In recent years its important inflationary effect 
began in I 1973 and has continued ever since - if with varying force. The last figure shown, 
106 for mid-May 1  9Y5  must cause trepidation if something is not done about it.  We sur-
mise, with confidence,  that this relative rise in price of Food was the major element of the 
acceleration in the rate of increase in incomes in the last two years. 
It may come as a surpris€' that,  relatively speaking,  those old tax-
gathering warhorses,  Drink and Tobacco are not to the inflati~~ary forefront in recent 
yPars.  Clothlng had a pressure pPriod from IV 1973 to IV 1974 but has receded.  The 
Fllf'l and light effect since 1  q 7  4 nPeds no comment.  The Housing effect (mainly due to 
rates) was most pronounced in 1972,  Transport in 1~71 and  agaln very recently.  The vety 
f'mphatic ratio of 11 s for Other goods in I 1975 was due entirely to Newspapers and perio-
dicals f'>r which  alon~ th~ ratio was 155 and which omitted, yielded a group index of T
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merely 91.  Neither Durables nor Services had any marked effect. 
rrable 4. ~1 
ThP upoer part of Table 4. 2 (as in Table 4.1) takes no account of group 
w('ightings.  In thP first half of 1975 (in fact the percentage increases mid-November 1974 
to mid-Mav 1?75) in order, with percentage increase, were: Transport 22,  Food 16,  Other 
goods l'i,  Fuel and light 11, Services etc.  10,  Clothing etc.  8,  Durables 8,  Housing 4. 
We omit Drink 23  and Tobacco 21,  as thesf' large increases are due almost entirely to 
budgetary policy.  Mere citation of these group figures,  indicating the commodity-wise 
pervasiveness of inflation,  is an indication of the magnitude of the task of curbing it. 
That middle-term objPctive of single digit inflation would mean less than 5 per cent in the 
half-vear. 
The magnitudes in the lower part of Table 4. 2 depends on both weights 
and the group percentages of the upper part.  Hence Food looms largest.  Of special 
momPnt is that the 6. 5 points in the latest period (II 1975) is by far the worst in the Food 
row,  a grave harbinger of what is likely to happen to incomes in the near future always, 
of course, with the qualification that nothing is done about it*.  In addition to Food (read-
ing row-wisP) Transport is about the only other group which shows a marked worsening 
in 1q75 so far,  compared with past quarters,  again without reference to Drink and  Tobacco. 
Individual Commodity and Service Prices 
CSO has kindly made available to us a fully detailed schedule of retail 
price percPntage changes in mid-February 1975 with mid-November 1968 as 100, with year 
-to-vear percentage changes for certain intervening pairs of years.  The tables contain 
particulars for no fewer than 364 descriptions of commodities,  precious treasure-trove 
for a study of inflation in its commodity aspect.  In what follows on this aspect we find it 
more convenient to deal with indexes instead of percentage changes. 
Naturally, we start with a citation of the commodities that increased 
most in the 6 and-a-half years, in order of demerit. 
(!able  4. ~ 
* See previous footnote. - -1_£)  -
Table 4. 2:  Changes in group CPis,  quarterly 1973-1975 
Percentage quarterly change to mid-
Group  1973  1974  1975 
I  IT  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II 
Food  8. 5  5.2  -1.0  2.8  3.8  5.0  3.7  6. 4  5.9  9. 6 
Alcoholic drink  1.2  o. 8  7.0  0.7  0.7  5.5  o. 4  1.4  20.1  2.5 
Tobacco  0.1  - 10. 2  0.2  - 3.3  0.2  0.1  21.3  0.1 
Clothing etc.  4. 7  4.2  3.5  4. 8  5. 6  4.9  3.9  5. 5  3.9  4. 3 
Fuel Pte.  o. 7  1.2  2.2  2.4  29.7  10.5  8.1  1.6  5.9  5.1 
Housing  0.6  1.3  o. 4  o. 7  2.9  2. 8  2. 8  4. 6  3.1  1.2 
Durables  3.2  3.0  2. 6  5. 2  5. 5  6.0  3.3  4.4  4. 2  3.8 
Other goods  1.3  0.<)  1.1  2. 4  4. 5  11.3  2. 8  10.0  10.5  3. 8 
Transport  -0.4  2.2  5. 4  5.1  2.4  7.1  6.6  1.7  11.6  9.7 
SPrvices etc.  3.2  2. 6  3.7  2. 7  3.1  3.4  4.2  5. 0  5. 8  4.0 
Total  4.0  3.0  2. 3  2. 8  4. 7  5.5  ~.8  4.6  8.0  6.1 
Points change 
Food  3.<)  2. 6  -0.5  1.4  2.0  2. 8  2.1  3.8  3.8  6. 5 
Alcoholic drink  0.1  - o. 8  - - 0.7  - o. 2  2.8  o. 4 
Tobacco  - - 0.8  - - 0.3  - - 1.9  -
Clothing etc.  0.6  0.5  o. 5  o. 7  o. 8  o. 8  o. 6  0.9  o. 7  o. 8 
Fuel etc.  - - o. 2  o. 2  2. 5  1.1  1.0  0.2  o. 8  o. 7 
Housing  - 0.1  - - 0.3  0.3  0.3  o. 5  o. 4  0.2 
Durables  0.2  0.2  o. 2  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.2  0.3  0.3  o. 3 
Other goods  - - - o. 2  0.4  o. 9  0.3  o. 9  1.1  0.4 
Transport  - 0.3  o. 8  o. 8  o. 4  1.2  1.2  o. 3  2.2  2.1 
Services etc.  0.5  0.4  o. 6  0.5  o. 6  0.6  o. 8  1.0  1.2  0.9 
Total  5. 5  4. 4  3. 5  4. 2  7.4  9.1  6. 6  8.3  15.1  12.4 
Source:  ISB and CSO bulletins 
Note 
In the lower ("Points change") part of the table,  dashes mean "small", not identically 
zero.  For this reason and also because of rounding group figures do not necessarily 
ad~ to total. - 17  -
Table 4. 3:  Commodities which increased most in retail price in mid-February 1975 
since mid-November 1968, with indexes to base mid-November 1968 as 100. 
Commodity  Index  Commodity {continued)  Index 
Cabbage  323  Linoleum  269 
Postage  317  Towels,  Turkish  265 
Cooking apples  317  Carpeting  263 
Newspapers,  periodicals  314  Tomatoes  263 
Onions  308  Cream crackers  258 
Carrots  301  Cups and  saucers  256 
Gas  287  Scrubbing brushes  254 
Potatoes  280  Shirts, collar attached  253 
Turnips  279  Housing repairs  252 
Laundry - charges for sheets  277  Whiting,  fillets  251 
Fuel oil  272 
Table 4. 4:  Number of items increasing most in price in two periods and null·hypothesis 
appraisal of their interperiod concordance. 
Increasf' more  Numbers of Items  Probability  Group and period  than  Value oft  appraisal 
Total  In common 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
% 
Food items 
1973-74  20  12~  2  -1.48  n. s. 
1974-75  2!)  19 
Other items-
1CJ73-74  20  56!  14  0.35  n. s. 
1974-75  25  46 
Col.  2:  Percentages arbitrary. 
Col.  5:  Ratios of deviation from null-hypotheses mean to s. d.  corresponding respec-
tively to 2 and 14 corrected for continuity.  (See Geary-Pratschke for formulae. ) 
Col.  6:  n. s. = not significant at • 05  probability level. - 118  -
Table 4. 3 contains the 21  commodities (out of the 364 descriptions) with 
indexes exceeding 250 (the general index being 203).  Its most remarkable feature is that 
it contai·ns six of the seven descriptions of fresh vegetables: one wonders why cauliflowers 
f208)  have not advanced with the rest !  Anyone who recalls the indecisive results of in-
quiries in the past into rPtail margins for these commodities will not be surprised at their 
achieving the notoriety of Table 4. 3 in a serious inflationary situation. 
It is mildly satisfactory that only 21  out of 364 descriptions (or 6. per 
cent) appear on this Table 4. 3 list.  Seven years ago Geary and  Pratschke* studied this 
problem of individual price changes from the viewpoints of (1)  frequency distribution and 
(2)  persistence of price increase leaders, two periods being selected for investigation, 
1953-1965 and 1963-65.  These,  of course, were periods of inflation (if far less grave than 
nowadays) so that the results may have some interest and relevance. 
Frequency distributions for both plain and log versions of the individual 
indexes were established,  plain being found to be heavily skewed in both periods.  The 
longer term (  1953-19  65) frequency of log indexes was also significantly skewed, but not the 
shorter (1963-65).  In fact,  generally the shorter term log distribution was by far the 
most interesting of all four studied.  Though symmetrical it was not normally distributed 
its~ value indicating a high concentration near the mean (i.e. inK.  Pearson's term "lep-
tokurtic"),  indicative of a high proportion of prices which have not changed much about the 
general mean.  Another conclusion is that the diversity in the changes in the prices of 
individual consumer goods increased markedly tn the later (i.e. 1963-1965 period). 
As to persistency, four short price change intervals (in fact of two 
years),  yielding three periods of comparison, 1954-1956 with 1956-1958 etc. were studied in 
thP whole period 1953-1  c:t65.  As regards all items (then numbering 197),  "we concluded 
that there is a strong tendency for rising prices item-wise to persist''. 
Geary and Pratschke also used the rudimentary methods above,  enab-
ling comparison with the showing of Table 4. 3.  The results are curious.  These authors 
listed ten commodities that rose significantly in price in all their four periods.  Not a 
stngle one of the earlier ten appears in our later twenty-one (Table 4. 3).  Furthermore 
I 
the earlier authors list the commodities with largest orice increases in periods 1953-1965 
*  Op.  cit. - IJ<l  -
and l963-196fi.  Four commodities* (out of 13) are common to the 1953-1965 and Table 
4. 3 lists two+ (out of 11) in the 1963-1965 and Table 4. 3 lists.  The discordance is less 
when it is pointed out that items (3  or 4 in fact)  of Drink and Tobacco figure prominently 
in all the earlier lists but are absent from the Table 4. 3 list.  Still, we are of the opinion 
that the more serious latter-day inflation was accompanied by a marked change in com-
modities of steepest increase. 
We do not consider it necessary (in view of the more specialized 
character of the present inquiry) to bring the Geary-Pratschke work on price frequency 
distributions up-to-{late.  We have,  however,  investigated the two latest annual price 
cha.Dge periods, i.e. 1973-1974 and  1974-1975 (mid-February in all cases) to try to dis-
cover any commodity-persistency,  i. e. is there any evidence that commodities that in-
creased most in price in the earlier period did  so in the later? 
The CSO list contained 364 descriptions of goods.  Examination showed 
that in the separate intervals in the whole period 1968-1975 certain descriptions tended 
always to increase in price by closely similar percentages, e. g.  the six descriptions of 
beef etc.  We decided that such commodities should be reduced to one,  e. g.  one descrip-
tion pnly of  beef,  its percentage price change being the simple average of the six changes. 
We also decided to omit drink,  tobacco and all oils because of their artificial circum-
stances.  Of the 364 original descriptions, there remained 257 commodities of which 52 
were Food and 205 Other.  The Geary-Pratschke analysis is given in Table 4. 4.  There 
is no evidence for particular items to persist in price rise in these two years of greatest 
inflation.  If the negative value for.! for Food were significant it would mean a tendency 
for ltems which rose,  in one year refrained the next and vice versa; as the actual value of 
!_ is not significant this inference cannot be made on this evidence a lone. 
[Table 4.1) 
The Table 4. 4 analysis pertained to the commodities with largest price 
increases in the two latest years.  When all commodities are taken into account simple 
correlations between price changes in the years 1973·- 1974 and 1974-1975 in the groups 
Food,  Other All items,  yielded the following results:-
* _Cooking apples,  .Papers and magazines,  Potatoes,  Carrots. 
+  Potatoes,  Papers and magazines. Group 
Food 
OthPr 
All Items 
Number 
52 
205 
257 
- I)()  -
c. c. 
-.34 
+.08 
-.10 
Significance 
• 01 '- NH P L • 02 
.10l. NHP 
• 05LNHP 
In the Food group there is evidence of negative relationship, i.e. there was a tendency for 
high- low in 1973-1974 to be followed by low -high.  This was absent from Other and All 
items. 
Prices of Services 
The full title of the section in the CPI system is "Services and Related 
Expenditure".  Direct information of the tre·nd of incomes in the service industries is~ so 
meagre as to justify a small study of price trends in this section for such clues as they 
may afford about non-wage incomes.  Table 4. 5 goes beyond this requirement: it hts 
some interest perhaps in showing what happens to prices in the almost entirely sheltel!ed 
service sector. 
[Table 4. 5J 
The usual theory pertaining to service industries is that average in~ 
comPs therein tend to rise similarly to those in other industry; capacity for productivi$y 
improvement is less in service industries: hence,  with inflation,  prices of services are 
liable to rise more than other prices.  Clearly such theory requires qualification in its 
application to Ireland. 
The column 4 figure of 95. 9,  i.e. well under 100,  tends to show that 
SPrvice prices were not a prime cause of inflation in Ireland.  A curious phenome·non  is 
that the column 5 figures,  averaging what happened in the whole period 1968-1975,  are 
nearlv always in excess of those of 1975 (column 3).  This might be interpreted as these 
services having had their major effect before 1974-1975,  the year of worst inflation,  and 
therefore contributing to this condition. 
Of more direct (if of very limited) interest in Table 4. 5 is the showing 
of items numbered 2,  3,  7 which probably reflect to a degree what is happening to non_. 
employee income.  Doctors' etc. fees seemed to be ahead of the general average, thr.ugh-
out the whole period,  if not during 1974-1975. 1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Table 4. 5:  Service-type commodity price indexes as percentages of AU Items indexes 
Previous year (mid-February)  Mid-November 1968 as 
Service-type  as 100  100 
commodity 
1974  1975  1974  1975 
1  2  3  4  5 
1.  Entertainment  96.5  93.3  91.5  98.6 
2.  Hairdressing  98.9  98.6  101.3  102.3 
3.  Shoe repairs  102.7  98.2  106.3  101.0 
4.  Laundry,  cleaning  98.6  105.3  104.4  100.7 
5.  Proprietary medicines  92.3  93.6  80.3  96.5 
6.  Other m~dicines, drugs  85.6  87.6  55.6  91.0 
7.  Doctors', dentists'fees  102.1  95.2  113.4  102.0 
8.  Hospital charges  109.4  93.7  118.5  102.8 
q_  Education  q5. 8  94.7  84.4  97.3 
o.  Domestic service  102.6  93.6  112.1  101.8 
1.  T elPvision rentals  91.3  93.6  72.8  95.0 
2.  Hot~l accommodation  103.5  103.0  106.1  101.0 
3.  Exp~nditur~ abroad  qq.4  93.7  96.4  99.4 
4.  Postage  105.5  114.9  156.0  107.4 
5.  Telephone,  telegraph  108.1  98.4  91.2  98.5 
6.  Sports' clubs subs.  98.7  102.2  119.8  102.9 
7.  Trade union subs.  96.9  93.2  74.8  95.5 
8.  Licences  128.0  99.8  101.3  100.2 
Total above  99.3  96.6  95.9  99.3 
Basic source:  ISB and CSO records. 
Note 
Ftcures for first five commodities are condensations of our own from more detailed CPI 
individual indexes. - 52  -
Conclusion as to Individual Commodity Prices 
Our brief examination has left us with the very strong impress ion  of the 
pervasiveness of inflation.  Even if at a high level of aggregation,  one must not exaggerate 
the differences in the ratios in Table 4 .1.  Having regard to the magnitude of the rise in the 
All Items CPI index since 1968,  the differences between the ratios is generally small.  Per-
vasiveness means that each individual rise in price contributed to general inflation causinr; 
income rises 'which,  in turn contributed to the further rise of the individual commodity. 
Cause and effect are indistinguishable.  It does not mean that,  in general,  certain price and 
certain income rises are the cause of inflation;  rather that inflation is  the maladz_ 
contributing some mean M per cent to all prices and incomes,  the individual (commodity, 
income,  group) effect being  m.,  so that the actual rise for indivudual i isM± m. with M 
1  1 
generally dominating m..  There is,  of course,  some surmise in the foregoing paragraph. 
1 
We  shall be content to regard it as something of a hypothesis,  to be examined further. - s.~  -
Chapter 5.  An Input-Output Approach 
The methodology of this section has been used by the Central Bank of 
Ireland* and the Department of Finance+ and the use to which it was put has encountered 
vigorous criticism by economists.++  This criticism, it would appear, bore less on the 
actual method than on the inferences which were drawn from the statistics. 
In fact,  several writers have animadverted on the use of I-0 analysis 
to estimate the precise contribution to price increases of different categories of primary 
inputs.  There are four major criticisms, according to Morgan, whose argument is out-
lined here.  First, the I-0 model assumes that all primary input prices are exogenously 
determined,  and hence in the case of wages and profits at any rate, are incorrectly-speci--
fied; furthermore it assumes that purchases do not substitute cheaper for dearer inputs. 
Second, the assumption of exogenously determined unit cost of non-employee income is par-
ticularly dubious.  Third,  the model takes a very limited view of the role of international 
influences, which are assumed to operate only through import prices (and perhaps also 
eJtl)Ort "9rices).  It is this point which has been most emphasi·sed by P. T.  Geary and by 
Mo0re McDow~ll.  Geary argues that the model ignores the macroeconomic channels 
wherf'by the external rate of inflation is transmitted to a small open economy with a fixed 
rate of exchange: these channels include the impact of changes in the balance of trade on 
aggregate demand via the foreign trade multiplier,  and of these changes and of changes in 
the inflow of capital on the domestic money supply.  Morgan's fourth criticism is that 
since the model takes primary input price increases as exogenously determined,  it can 
dP.scribe only the proximate reasons for movements in the prices of final products,  and 
can say little about the fundamental causes of inflation.  We refrain from comment on 
these arguments being content to place them on record for the benefit of readers. 
* Quarterly Bulletin of the Central Bank of Ireland, Spring 1974. 
+  Government White Paper "A National Partnership" Prl.  4141,  1974. 
++ 
P. T.  Geary: "The Causes of Inflation",  JSSISI  1974-75,  Vol.  23,  Part 2:  E.  Victor 
Morgan:  "Causes and Effects of Inflation in Ireland" NESC.  Report No.  10 Moore 
Mac Dowell:  'The Control of Inflation in a Small Economy",  Studies,  Spring 1975. - '1t1  -
As R. C.  Geary* was associated with first applications of the 1-0 
m~thod to Irish price data,  it may be useful if we now give a brief appraisal of the method, 
attempting to state clearly what it does and what it does not do,  from a purely statistical 
p~Jint of view. 
The retail price of any commodity or service at any time can be br~en 
down into the cost of home-produced ingredients, fuel and light,  at farm or factory prtoes, 
imports (valued c. i. f.),  indirect taxes less subsidies, transport and distribution costs 
(all stages), wages and salaries, profits, depreciation,  financial charges and perhaps a 
few more.  Costs deemed "primary" for 1-0 purposes are the seven shown in the first 
column of Table 5. 1,  all others "inter-industry". 
To start with,  this classification is direct, meaning that for any of t'-e 
primary inputs no account is taken of the fact that so-called home-produced ingredients 
themsE-lves contain imports and other primary inputs and  so on ad infinitum.  In its price 
asp~ct, the objE-ct of 1-0 is to derive the total price effect (primary +secondary+ tertiqry 
+ad. inf.) of price changes in each primary input.  What is remarkable is that ultimate 
orice changes in each inter-industry sector,  and thence to household consumption as a 
whole,  can be derived from initial changes,  of course with rigorous simplifying conditi<ms, 
as will appear. 
Perhaps the most restrictive of tliese is that, not possessing an 1-0 
table for Ireland for every year, we must assume a constant quantum structure (namely, 
that of the latest year of availability,  1969).  This means that the base year structure dn 
both intE-r -industry and primary inputs)  of each of the 33 sectors is deemed to apply quantity 
-wise throughout our period of reference 1968-1974, though in fact the product-mix,  and· 
the ingredient-mix for each product,  must change from year to year because of price, 
technology etc.  changes.  This structure for each sector can be represented as totalling 
unity in 1969.  Prices (really price i·ndexes) in 1968 are all unity.  The 1-0 price system 
is solved by writing down 33 linear equations stating that,  in each year of reference, current 
price change (since 1969) equals change in total costs (including profit,  also with its fixed 
quantum).  We give an outline of the algebra in Appendix 3. 
*  Lectures on Input-Output,  ESRI L.  Series, No.  1, 1966 (mimeographed); (with J. L. 
Pratschke) ''Some Aspects of Price Inflation in Ireland", ESRI Paper No.  40,  1968; 
(with E. W.  Henry and J. L.  Pratschke) "The Recent Price Trend in Ireland", The 
Economic and Social Review,  Vol.  1, No.  3,  1970. - 5~ -
In I-0 in its price aspect the producer always "gets his price". 
SPctor prices have essential!  y more the character of supply than of demand prices.  Of 
course, we could add other variables and other equations and  get different answers; and 
these answers might be more convincing for verifying a cause-effect hypothesis. 
[Table 5.1] 
Another restriction to the I-0 price system is its assumption that 
sectryrs' selling price indexes to each other purchasing sector are the same, which is 
manifestly not the case,  since selling sectors'  product-mix to other sectors may be dif-
ferent.  Yet another restriction applicable here is that for each primary input,  price 
cht.nge was the same for all sectors a procedure necessary because of unavailability of 
sectoral data. 
Despite all these breaches with reality we might hope that as we require 
but a single figure for each primary input and each year, errors would tend to cancel out. 
As· an overall check we have therefore juxtaposed in Table 5.1 (last two rows) the actual 
naUonal account price !leflator for personal expenditure .and the calculated I -0 index. 
The two series compare very well year-by-year.  The fact that the I-0 
overall increase of 87 per cent exceeds the actual percentage of 77 is of no importance 
from the present point of view.  Some excess is to be expected for much the same reason 
that the base-weighted Laspeyres always: exceeds the true rise in price.  The assumed 
coastancv of the I-0 table quantity-wise ruled out adjustments which must have taken place 
in response to differential price changes in the general direction of mitigating the price 
tnorease. 
We therefore take the view that the detailed figures in Table 5.1 are 
broadlv acceptable.  Their interpretation is more difficult as a guide for action.  Obviously 
imports in 1974 and over the whole period were a major direct inflationary influence. 
Imports could also have indirect effects on incomes through consumer prices.  We leave 
open any causal interpretation of this table. 
Fortunately, we are concerned only with non-employee incomes, items 
5 anti 6 in Table !=l. 1.  Whether the table can be given a causal interpretation or not,  if the 
coatributions to total changes are small,  or negative, we argue that this effect is small. 
We would also consider this argument reinforced by the fact that,  in a period of constantly 
rising nrices,  the contributions WP.re very variable - actually negative (for Agriculture) - '56  -
in 1974 whe·n prices rise so sharply. 
Conclusion as to Input-Output Pricing 
We regard Table 5.1 as about the most important we have devised for 
this research.  But also,  as we stated above,  its interpretation is difficult.  We  absolve 
ourselves of this task here (except as regards Other income) in the sense that here and 
elsewhere we have made it our main concern to set down and to analyse statistically all the 
relevant statistics, drawing what seem to us only obvious conclusions therefrom,  leav~g 
purely economic discussion to others, but with the humble expectation that our statistiqs 
• 
will be found useful in such discussion. 
Here we claim that,  despite the stated deficiencies of the I-0 approach, 
a comparison of the last two rows of the table shows that the method used is soundly based. 
In l<l74,  when inflation aporoached the catastrophic, import prices,  as allowed for by 1-0 
(and,  as stated above,  there are additional effects),  accounted for about two-thirds of ~e 
total rise in prices.  As emphasised in Chapter 1, there is a specific Anglo-Irish dimen-
sion in the price trend expressing itself tn incomes,  i. e.  at least in the short run, tncollle 
restraint is essential.  As far as Ireland alone is concerned it is obvious (as strongly 
recommended by Geary and  Pratschke* in less serious  circumstances),  that Irish prioe 
trends should be kept below those of  UK,  which has manifestly not been happening in the 
last few years. 
Noting that in both agriculture and non-agriculture Other income coa-
tributions have always been far lower than the employee remuneration figure and having 
particular regard to the contrast in 1974 (with the non-agricultural Other income contribu-
tion negative) we hold that this I-0 approach lends no support,  at the macro level,  ton~­
employee incomes' havtng an appreciable effect on inflation in recent years.  This is the 
major conclusion of this research. 
Unless profitability of Other incomes can be substantially improvedti 
especiallv in non-agriculture,  the future for economic development in Ireland is grim. 
It cannot be too often repeated that decisions in the private sector are the preserve of 
recioients of Other income.  Improvement in Other income is merely a necessary con  .. 
ditlon.  The geoneral climate of opinion amongst Other income earners as to the future, 
*  Op.  cit. ,  Chapter 1. - 'l7  -
influencing present action or inaction as to investment etc. ,  is overwhelmingly important. 
Other income earners are not automata,  and are generally in a stronger financial position 
to postpone decisions than are wage earners. 
Tabl~  1,  Contributions of primary input prices to xear...to.year changes in consumer 
prices 1969-1974. 
Percentage increase on previous year  Percentage 
in'crease 197  4 
Primary input  11969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  on 1968 
Actual  % 
1.  Imports  1.2  1.9  1.7  1.3  3.8  12.4  31.8  36.4 
2.  Indirect taxes  2.4  2.3  1.7  1.4  2.1  1.5  14.0  16.0 
3.  Subsidies  -0.5  -0.3  -0.1  0.0  -0.5  -1.4  -3.7  -4.2 
4.  Wages and salaries  2.8  3.7  2.8  3.0  3.6  4.9  26.7  30.6 
Non -wage factor incomes -
5.  Agriculture  0.4  0.3  0.3  2.3  2.7  -1.1  5.8  6.6 
6.  Non -Agriculture  1.8  0.0  0.5  1.7  0.7  0.8  6.8  7.8 
7.  Depreciation  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.6  1.5  5.9 I 
6.8 
-
TOTAL 1-0 (above)  8.7  8.4  7.4  10.3  13.1  18.6  87.3  100.-
Consumption expenditure 
deflator  6.0  8.4  9.1  8.6  11.0  17.3  77.1  -
Notes 
Calculations are based on the 1969  33 -sector 1-0 table (CSO,  unpublished). 
A  sketch of the underlying algebra is given in Appendix 3. 
Estimates were made for each primary input price index change (base unity) 
separately, i.e. the  !J 1r • ,  from which were derived the sectoral price index changes, i.e. 
the  b. p., which,  applied t1> the unitised (1. e. adding to unity) household consumption weights 
(and making allowance for the primary input part of household consumption) gave the change 
in the household budget price index (base unity) due to the price change for this single pri-
mary input.  Due to the linear character of the 1-0 system, the effects due to separate 
primary input price changes are additive, to give the total price change due to the several 
primary input price changes. 
These calculations were computed separately for the intervals 1968-69,  1969· 
-70,  1969-71,  •.• ,  1969-74, i.e. always with 1969,  the year to which the 1-0 table relates, 
as base - for each primary input these were converted to the year-to-year figures shown. 
These were deemed to add exactly to estimated total change shown in the second last line. - 11B  -
Notes to Table 5.1 (cont'd) 
The "Actual" figures 87. 3 in the second last row is found as the product 
1. 873 = 1. 087 x 1. 084x ..• x1.186.  The detailed primary "Actual" figures are found 
similarly but proportionately adjusted to total 87. 3. 
See also NIEC Report No.  11 and Central Bank Quarterly Bulletin No.  1, 
1974,  in general relation to the interpretation of this table. 
j''  '  .. - 59  -
Chapter 6.  Professional Incomes 
No direct up-to-date information on higher professional incomes being 
available, we had to make an indirect approach.  The general trend of earnings in the 
period 1968-1973 is also dealt with. 
Fees paid by the State 
This section is based mainly en information very kindly supplied by the 
Departments of Finance and the Public Service about professional fees current throughout 
the Irish public service in recent years. *  Reference dates differ for the different profes-
sions so that it will be more convenient to co·nsider each profession separately.  The 
method is always to juxtapose actual (''nominal") fees in index form and these indexes 
deflated by CPI of closest date. 
The data displayed in Table 6.1 are condensations from very volumin-
ous official schedules.  The indexes described as ''nominal" are unweighted in all cases; 
in fact,  they are the simple averages of ratios for sub-indexes within each description of 
profession.  The fact of these estimates being unweighted is, in general, no disadvantage 
since,  ln most cases, the sub-indexes were very similar so that properly weighted es-
timates (if possible of calculation) would have yielded much the same results as those 
shown.  In the case of dentistry, however,  the sub-indexes were very different,  so that a 
judicious selection had to be made for averaging; the values of the omitted sub-indexes 
were very much lower than those included,  so that the figures shown are proBably over-
eJtimates. 
[Table  6.;) 
The CPI deflators used were those deemed to apply at the exact dates of 
change when these were specified.  They were usually found by linear interpolation from 
the official quarterly figures nearest that date.  All deflated series have been brought to 
mid-May 1975,  so that the nominal index at that date is the same as at the previous date 
of change,  but the latest deflated index is l.ower. 
ThP firures are subiect to the following reservations:-
*  We are indebted to K. A.  Kennedy for suggesting this approach. - (1()  -
1.  The fees paid by  the state would,  of course,  represent only a proportion 
of total income of professionals.  Table 6. 2 will show the complete picture. 
2.  They relate to only a few professions. 
3.  They reflect the gross situation.  To obtain net income there should have 
been deducted the cost of employee remuneration and materials which no 
doubt increased here considerably, as everywhere else. 
By reference to deflated series the evidence of Table 6.1 is conflicting: 
some profPssional activities got more than CPI would warrant,  some less.  In the two, 
cases Hast of No.  3 and No.  5)  in which the last of the deflated series exceeds 100, refe-
rencP to Chart 1 will show that, up to the end of 1974 the nominal indexes were less th~ 
thosf' for hourly earnings in TG industries. 
Professional Earnings 1 q68-1  q74 
An  earnings index for higher professional occupations has been com• 
piled from data derived from a small example of incomes.  The index is shown in column 
2 of Table 6. 2. 
[Table  6. 2) 
It is clear from Table 6. 2 that earnings of professional persons behaved 
quite similarly to TG  employee earnings over the period 1968-1974,  a substantial diffe-
rence arising only in 1972.  Moreover, these professional earnings agree roughly with, 
those presented in Table 6.1 and based on fees paid in the public sector. 
If, as used exte·nsively elsewhere, we had bee·n able to compare unit 
costs of the two groups,  the contrast would,  we suspect, be greater.  Unit costs would be 
the indexes in columns 2 and 3 divided by labour productivity.  We know that the increase 
in productivity was considerable in TG industry,  i'n fact 3~ per cent per annum in the 
pPriod rl68-197~.  We do not know anything about productivity increase of these non-
employee professionals, but we surmise it to be less than in TG industry. 
Conclusion as to Professional Other Income 
Bv the tests used in this study these incomes seem not to be excep-
tionally inflationary.  The impact of professional earnings on the general inflationary - 61  -
situation must, however, be small.  If, at a guess, we attribute a salary of  £5, 000 to 
each of the 8, 200 technical and professional workers in the categories employers and  own 
account,  total professional income would be less than 2 per cent of the national income in 
1974.  Such a calculatio·n discounts any possible "demonstration effect" of increases in 
orofessional earnings. T
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Table 6. 2:  Index numbers of earnings of professional persons per head, nominal and as 
deflated by  CPl.  1968-1974 with comparative figures for TG employee 
earnings. 
1968 as 100  • 
Nominal  Deflated by CPI 
Year 
Professional  TG employee  Professional  TG employee 
earnings  earnings  earnings  earnings 
1  2  3  4  5 
1968  100  100  100  100 
1969  113  112  105  104 
1970  122  128  105  110 
1971  153  147  120  116 
1972  184  169  134  123 
1973  206  201  134  131 
1974  237  237  132  132 
Notes 
Col.  2 figures, based on  averages derived from a  5%  sample of Reve·nue income data. 
The professional workers referred to in this table are broadly those employer and own 
account workers,  in higher professional occupations in the industry Professional Ser-
vices,  as returned in the Ce·nsus of Populatio·n.  Col. 3  figures refer to weekly ear-
ntngs. - 65-
Chapter 7.  Profits of Irish Public Companies 
A  table in Trade Union Infonnation (July-September 1975) shows that 
the year-to-year percentage increase in pre-tax profits in the one hundred or so public 
companies reporting in the year ended June was 39% in 1973,  33% in 1974 and  only 7% in 
19'75.  Rather similar percentages are obtained for post-tax profits and divide·nds.  As 
the changes in the CPI for year ended June were respectively (in%) 10, 14 and 22, it is 
evident that in the recent pre-depression period Irish public companies were doing very 
well. 
Scrutiny of the individual accounts,  also published by TUI,  however, 
showed a great variation in the period to which the account related,  raislng a doubt as to 
inferences to be drawn from statistics based on period of report,  as the foregoing.  Accor-
dingly w~  decided to trv to reproduce the percentages as closely as we could according to 
the fonner conc~pt.  This proved difficult,  and  the figures in Table 7.1 are to be regarded 
as approximations for reasons which will be clear from the Notes.  At least we are cer-
tain that they give a truer picture than that from the reporti"ng period concept,  in the abrupt 
transition from prosperity to depression,  accompanied by sharply increasing inflation. 
Table 7. 1.  Percentage year-to-year changes in profits and dividends of Irish public com-
panies 1972-1973 and 1973-1974. 
Percentage change on previous year 
YPar  No.  of companies  Profits 
Dividends  CPI 
Pre-tax  Post-tax 
1C)'J3  91  +38. 2  +40.9  +33.6  +11.4 
1C)74  86  -18.5  -18.9  - 8. 9  +17. 0 
Basic source:  Trade Unio·n Infonnation issues to that of November-December 1975 
Notes  -
'l'Jle 1974 data are bas~d on accounts of public companies reporting up to end June 1975 but 
which related to trading in year ending within the twelve months July 1974 - June 1975, 
with corresponding figures for previous year.  Similarly for the year 1973.  These aret 
deemed to show calendar year changes. - 66  -
The number of companies in Table 7.1 included in the 1974 calculation 
falls short of exactly the 100 companies reporting in the period July 1974- June 1975. 
Nevertheless there can be little doubt that for the aggregate of all public companies a sub-
stantial profit increase in the years 1972 and 1973 was converted into a decrease in profit 
in 1974.  The loss of 19 per cent for the 86 companies shown in Table 7.1 for 1974 com-
pares with the TUI figure for profit of 7 per cent for the 100 reporting companies.  fhe 
percentage changes for public companies shown in Table ·7 .1 are before adjustment for stock 
appreciation,  so formidable in recent years.  Realistically (i.e. after such adjustment) 
the 197  4 percentage profit changes would be worse than as shown. 
We must try to compare the experience of public companies with that 
of all companies and all other income.  On the same basis as Table 7.1, the profits of 
the 86 public companies for the year 1973 were £59. 9m; according to NIE 1973 the es-
timated non-AFF "trading profits of companies (including all corporate bodies) before 
tax" was £248m.  Profits of public companies are accordingly only one-quarter of the 
profits of all companies.  We infer that the profit experience of all companies could be 
very different percentage-wise from that of public companies. 
Table 7. 2 with all its different no·n-availabilities and basic sources, 
is an attempt to bring the public company profit change situation up-to-date.  It goes 
without saying that the figures increase in uncertainty as time goes on:  none-the-lesl 
are based on published figures from reliable sources. 
Table 7. 2:  Percentage vear-to-year changes in non-AFF profits and Other income 
before and after allowance for adjustment for price of stocks (AAPS), 
1972-1976. 
1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
Trading profits:-
All companies:-
Before AAPS  +28. 5  +33. 5  n. a.  n. a.  n. a. 
After AAPS  +24.0  +17. 8  ·n. a.  n. a.  n. a. 
Public companies (before AAPS)  +39.3  +38. 2  -18.5  n. a.  n. a. 
Other income:-
Before AAPS  +22. 6  +26.4  +14. 5  +5.5  +20. 9 
After AAPS  +18. 8  +13.7  +  7.4  +12. 2  +26.8 
n. a. : not available.  Basic sources:  NIE  1973  TUI to November-December 1975  QEC 
January 1976,  RPO June '75. - 67-
First it is to be remarked that trading profits of all non-AFF companies before tax form 
most of Other income - in fact 56 per cent of it before tax and before AAPS in 1973.  We 
may surmise therefore that company profit experience in 1975 and  1976 may be like that of 
all Other income.  This may not be the case with public companies with (as we have shown) 
profits only a fourth of those of all companies.  In interpreting the table it may help to note 
that QEC sets percentage rises of implicit personal consumer expenditure prices at 17,  21 
and 11t in 1974, 1975 and  1976. 
Main inferences from Table 7. 2 appear to be:-
(1)  As early as 1973 the after AAPS  effect (i.e.  cash shortage)  on company profits 
was very drastic. 
(2)  The AAPS effect may become favourable in 1975 and  1976. 
(3)  No improvement is to be expected in all or public companies in 1975 compared with 
1974.  There may be improvement in 1976. 
(4)  In 1972 and 1973 public companies were doing better than all companies. 
C<!!clusion as to Public Companies 
Public companies are, of course, the larger companies.  One assumes 
that these are the bell-wethers of the non-agricultural part of the economy.  That they were 
so euccessful before the present recession augurs well for the economy as a whole,  for 
theee results were achieved in the rigours of substantial rises· in prices of materials and in 
wace rates over which managements had little control.  Managements must have been taking 
an optimistic view of economic prospects in Ireland in these years, i.e. that investment 
wu likelv to be profitable. 
Still, Table 7.1 shows that the transition from profit to loss can be very 
severe and sudden,  so much more so than in the case of prices and wages.  The showing is 
the more serious for the whole economy in that,  as so often repeated in this paper, decision 
as to level of activity in the private sector rests largely with managements of big concerns 
and such decisions are based on long-term profitability.  We  can only hope that these decis-
ionl are not too much influenced by short-term experience, in which the world wide depres-
sioa plaved its part. - 69  -
Chapter 8.  Manufacturing Industry 
The latest year for which the results of a complete CIP are available 
is 1972.  It is unfortunate that this date is so remote.  However,  the data ar~ not irre-
levant to a general study of inflation which,  as will have been amply clear from previous 
chapters, has been happening all the time, if with acceleration in the last two years. 
Our principal instrument in this chapter is Appendix Table A6.1. 
There we show for 40 manufacturing industries index numbers (to base 1958 as unity) of all 
statistics that seemed relevant to our main topic,  non-employee income, for which No.6, 
unit cost of remainder of net output,  (i. e. net output less employee remuneration) is the 
proxy.  Nos.  4,  5,  6,  7 and 12 are ''prices" in the wider sense; the other variables are 
deemed to be relatt'd to these.  It will be noted that No.  1, index of fixed capital stock at 
cao.stant oricPs,  relatPs to the year 1968 the latest for which these data are available. 
T~  classification of industries used is that of CIP.  Five industries were omitted because 
som~ of their indext's were bizarre which may have been due to appreciable changes in 
product type. 
The base year selected is 1958 as marking the beginning of the indus-
trial upsurge.  General increases in certain variables 1958-1972 were as follows:-
Percentage increases per year for total manufacturing 1958-1972 (except as otherwise 
indicated) 
Fixed capital stock at constant prices* 
Volume of output 
Net output price (unit value) 
Unit costs:-
* 
Employee remuneration 
Remainder net output 
Materials 
1958-1968 
Per cent 
per year 
8.1 
6.4 
5.8 
5.1 
6.4 
3.1 - 10-
Continued 
Percentage increases per year for total manufacturing 1958-1972 (except as otherwisp 
indicated) 
Employment 
Productivity:-
Labour 
Fixed capital stock* 
+  Factor 
Share of remainder of net output in total net output 
Employee remuneration per employee 
Consumer price index 
* 1958-1968 
Per cent 
per year 
2.4 (2. 6)* 
3.9 
-1.1 
1.4 
0.6 
9.2 
4.7 
+ Factor productivity:  let x  be expected NO  in 1968 on basis of number of employees and 
constant price fixed capita\ in 1968 applied to 1958 rates of employee remuneration per 
employee and RNO per £ capital.  let x  be value of NO  1958 - and v  index 1968 af 
volume of output (base 1958 as unity).  TB'en  index of factor productlvily 1968=v1x0~: 
The great increase in capital stock is a reminder  of the character of Other 
income:  it must be rewarded and it is a very important source (through business sav~ 
of new capital investment.  In regard to this increase in capital stock the increase in 
output was disappointing.  In fact,  confining attention to the period 1958-1968 (l.e. of 
fixed capital volume statistics availability) we find:-
Value remainder net output per unit of volume of fixed_ capital 
Employee remuneration per employee 
Increase per cent 
per year 
4.4 
7.3 - 71  -
In Chapter 1 comparison between employee remuneration and Other 
inoome in trends of unit costs is subject to the qualification that changes in the unit cost 
index could have come about,  in whole or i'n part, by changes in quanta of labour and of 
physical capital applied.  The last two figures may be deemed correct for these different 
quanta.  This is clear for the labour rate of 7. 3 per cent:· note ''per employee".  The first 
figure means that in manufacturing industry in the ten years 1958-1968 quasi-profit per 
quantum unit of fixed capital applied increased by 4. 4 per cent per annum.  In more simple 
t~rms: the reward for labour increased at nearly twice the rate as for capital. 
While the increase in labour productivity has been substantial there has 
actually been a decline in capital productivity, i.e. the quotient of volume output by the 
volume of fixed capital stock.  It is pretty obvious that the impressive improvement in 
labour productivity in the ten years 1958-1968 was largely due to labour  having more 
and better plant,  equipment and building at its disposal.  In 1958 fixed capital per worker 
in manufacturing industry was £1, 100; in 1968 it was £1,900,  capital being valued at con-
stant prices. 
Naturally, factor productivity (i.e. quantum output in relation to both 
labour and capital combined) has risen far less than labour productivity, in fact by 1. 4 
p(lr cent per year  • 
•  ,~ _t 
Individual Industries 
Appendix Table A6.1 contains material which may not be directly rele-
va1lt to the pr~sent study.  Researchers tn other topics in the field of manufacture may 
however find them interesting.  It may be observed that should any relationships between 
the factors seem likely on these data,  involving comparison only between 1958 and 1972, 
they can be strengthened by single step data between consecutive years, thus with multip-
lication of data.  If,  however,  investigation of the present data does not yield significant 
r(llults,  there does not seem much point in exte·nding tnquiry to year-to-year material. - 72-
Variability between the 40 industries for each of the 12 statistics can 
best be compared by using the coefficient of variation (c. v. ) i. e.  the ratio of the standard 
deviation to the mean coefficient of variation for data of the Appendix 6:  Table A6.1:-
1.  Fixed capital stock at constant prices 
2.  Value of gross output 
3.  Volume of gross output 
4.  Gross output price (unit value) 
Unit cost:-
5.  Employee remuneration 
6.  Remainder of net output 
7.  Materials 
8.  Employment 
9.  Labour productivity 
10.  Value of net output 
11.  Share of remainder of net output in total net output 
12.  Employee remuneration per employee 
• 48 
• 60 
• 49 
• 21 
• 30 
.33 
• 27 
• 40 
.34 
• 50 
.17 
.11 
The three with lowest c. v. s. those numbered in order 12, 11,  and 4:, 
are perhaps of the greatest interest.  The lowness of No.  12 indicates the propensity of 
wages to have the same rise throughout industry.  The variable No.  11 figure shows that 
within each industry the change in the "share" of net output was comparatively low.  The 
figure for variable No.  4 shows that price changes were fairly uniform in the different 
manufacturing industries,  another illustration of the pervasiveness of inflation,  a point to 
which we attach great importance.  The fairly large figure for change in labour produc-
tivity (No.  q) is indicative of a disappointingly sizable variation throughout industry,  though 
this may have been partly due to variation in size of firm and other causes, including 
variation in volume of output. 
The c. v.  for our main variable No.  6,  while much greater than that for 
gross output price is much the same as for employee remuneration and,  indeed, for price 
of materials. 
The Correlation System 
In a purely exploratory spirit, unhampered by hypotheses, we produced - 73-
the full correlation matrix for the thirteen variables in Table A6.1 - see Table A6. 2 and 
the Note thereto.  With 40  pairs of variables the conventional null-hypothesis critical 
probability points are:-
Probability  c. c.  value  Significance symbol 
• 001  0  50  xxxx 
• 01  • 40  XXX 
o 02  • 37  XX 
• 05  o 31  X 
These are described as "conventional" tn the sense that they apply only 
to pairs that are random to one another which is manifestly not the case with many pairs 
i"n  Table A5. 2,  having regard to the way they were calculated.  There is also the point 
that if all 13 variables were e·ntirely random to one another a few c. c. would be found  to 
be conventionally "significant" (in fact about 8 at • 05  probability) of course an untenable 
inference.  Generally speaking the foregoing critical c. c.  values would have to be much 
higher - we do not know by how much - to be associated with the probabilities indicated. 
Our prime interest is with No  6, *unit cost index of remainder of NO 
i"ndex.  This is positively related to unit cost of employee remuneration (No.  5).,  The 
partial c. c. between the two variables 5 and 6 with No.  11  constant (symbolically r56•11) 
was as high as • q1,  an interesting result. 
Of perhaps greater interest is that No.  6 seems negatively related to 
No.  q -labour productivity r69 = -. 40  (xxx),  i.e. the greater the increase in labour pro-
ductivity the lower the increase tn unit cost of Other income and vice versa. 
Probably ·non-trivial conventionally significant results derived from 
TablP AFt. 2 are the following: 
*  Variable numbers are as in Notes to Table A6.1. Variable 
numbers 
1, 8 
1,12 
1,13 
3,5 
3,9 
4,8 
4,9 
5, 6 
5,9 
6,9 
9,11 
Sign  Significance 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
:XXX  X 
X 
XXX 
XX 
X 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
xxxx 
XXX 
XX 
- 74-
Nature of relationship, in words, in brief* 
Employment increases with capital 
Pay increases with capital 
Capital increase% largest in labour-intensive 
industry. 
Greater increase in GO volume lower increase in 
unit cost of labour 
Greater increase in GO volume greater increase in 
lab.  prod. 
Greater increase in GO  price, greater increase in 
employment 
Greater increase in GO price, lesser increase in 
lab.  prod. 
Greater increase unit cost labour, greater increase 
remainder NO. 
Greater increase unit cost labour, lesser increase 
lab.  prod. 
Greater increase unit cost remainder NO lesser 
increase in lab.  prod. 
Greater lab.  prod. greater increase in share of RNO 
in NO. 
While the relationships we deem non-trivial are few,  it is statistically 
satisfying that,  in general,  the results in Table A6. 2 are consistent.  It should be noted 
that the foregoing results and indeed all in Table A6. 2 are associative, not causative, in 
character. 
It would lead us too far afield to attempt further examination of the data 
in Tables A6.1 and A6. 2:  analysis by partial correlation or econometric equations might 
be rewarding.  We suggest that Table A6. 1 is worthy of scrutiny, for instance to note facts, 
as that the 1972 index of unit cost of remainder of NO for sugar refining is 481,  by far the 
largest figure in the column,  and to note that this industry is about the nearest in practice 
* For full description see Notes to Appendix Table A6.1. - 75-
to a monopoly in the Irish Republic.  We freely admit that we may have fallen for the 
theoretical appeal of this comment: the truth may be more simple, e. g.  a change in the 
content of RNO,  our proxy for Other income,  or the world price of sugar etc. 
Some of the relations in Table A6. 2,  even though conventionally insig-
nificant are interesting.  This remark applies especially to variable No.  13,  capital per 
person engaged in 1968,  an absolute figure,  be it noted,  and not an inaex.  We introduce 
this variable, we confess, not in relation to the present study,  but for our interest in the 
labour-intensive v.  capital-intensive industry issue.  This is of crucial importance for 
Ireland, with endemically high unemployment and underemployment problems.  In such a 
•ituation we should favour labour-intensive industry, unless there were such telling argu-
ments against it as that,  as a method, it is obsolescent,  e. g.  that over a period its output 
was proportionately less than for capital-intensive industry. 
Low values of variable No.  13 indicate labour-intensive industry. 
From Table A6. 1 we note that,  i"n 1968,  the most labour intensive industries were (in 
order) shirtmaking,  miscellaneous clothing,  women's clothing, men's clothing, boots and 
•hoes, i.e. simpliciter clothing (with less than £1,000 per employee), labour intensive in 
most countries,  especially the Third World.  · Highest values (i.e. most capital-intensive) 
are fertilisers (at £ 8, 000 by far the largest) and brewing.  Ireland is a country with one 
ef the largest proportions of exports i"n  relation to GD P i"n  the world.  It is a little unfor-
tunate that labour intensity in Ireland should be greater for clothing industries, in which 
,rosuects for substantial increase in exports seem bleak.  The No.  13 column neverthe-
.lPss mav afford guidance in policy formation away from undue capital intensity. 
Variable No.  13 is insignificantly related to the production indexes value 
and volume of GO (Nos.  2,  3)  employment (No.  8),  value of NO (No.  10).  If capital inten-
lity were related to growth we would expect significantly positive c. c. s.  We infer that 
there is no significant relationship between labour or capital intensity and growth. 
Conclusion as to Manufacturing Industry 
We have ranged so widely that we find it difficult to comment in relation 
to our main topic,  Other income.  The proxy therefore,  No.  6,  appears only once in our 
o. c.  schema,  to the effect that its index is positively related to that of unit cost of labour. - 76-
WP are again impressed by the pervasiveness of inflation. 
Some of the insignificant relationships are as interesting as the non-
trivial significant ones; for instance, between variables No.  3 (volume growth) and No.  6 
unit cost RNO.  Surely one would have expected a pronounced negative relationship; we 
find a negative c. c. but it is not significant.  Also we find a lack of association between 
this growth variable No.  3 and capital intensity (No.  13). - 77  -
Chapter 9.  Concluding Remarks 
So far our treatment has been austerely statistical.  In this last chap-
ter we allow ourselves more speculative freedom.  We start with our first thought,  namely, 
that in a small country with a relatively huge export trade,  rise in Other income in the 
private sector must be very 1nuch more an effect than a cause of inflation.  We  regard 
this hypothesis as not disproved after the fairly thorough analysis of this paper. 
•x ante Thinking* 
Before serious analysis of the data our first thoughts were that any con-
trollable effects of Other income on inflation were negligible compared with imports and 
other external effects,  employee remuneration and government expenditure.  The impor-
tant word here is "controllable".  Such an hypothesis is not falsified ·by the fact that in-
come earners of all kinds are equally "responsible" for inflation,  in the sense that a will-
Ing or forced reduction of income of a given amount would have more or less the same 
effect in all categories in lessening inflation.  The point is that (in our tnitial view) reci-
pients of Other income have collectively little autonomous power to increase it, in Irish 
conditions.  This is a macro viewpoint; we would of course, try to isolate groups, if any, 
In a quasi-monopolistic situation,  including self-employed professionals and the groups they 
l)OSSiblv influence income-wise.  It is essential to bear ln mind that it is change in this 
latter situation that matters. 
Our thinktng is largely based on the genesis of Other incQJne,  i.e. the 
way it is derived, fundamentally different from that of employee remuneration.  Other in-
come tn the private sectors consists of (1) income earned by working proprietors and 
members of their families and (2) rents, dividends,  interest, etc; the distinction between 
(1) and (2) is mainly between small and non-small concerns.  Other income is, from one 
point of view,  essentially a residue as the differe·nce between selling value and all costs. 
Employee remuneration is a prior charge, often regarded nowadays as exogenous in 
analysis: Other income depends on price of product or service.  Herein lies the funda-
mental distinctio·n between the two main constituents of added value.  But, will the enter-
'  priser get his price?  His success is assured only if he is a monopolist,  in whole or in 
part. 
* See Appendix 8,  for which the authors are very much indebted to Mr. J.J. Walsh, 
Chilirman,  National Prices Commission. - 78  -
To a considerable degree throughout the economy the offering price is 
cost plus, i.e. the cost of all inputs plus a fixed percentage.  Whfie the topic has been 
much debated in Ireland,  and we have not avoided its resumption in this paper, we may 
state that,  having regard to the vast changes in prices and other economic variables dur-
:f 
ing the past half-century, businessmen in Ireland have been successful in maintaining the~ 
proportion (1. e. in getting the offered price) borne by Other income in added value, if  witlt. 
some lessening in recent years.  Controversy on  "the proportion" has centred on whether 
there bas been a significant change at all?  The short answer is: there has, but it is 
small in relation to other magnitudes involved. * 
Other income,  therefore, depends largely on price of product or ser-
vice.  With imports equivalent in 1973 to 45 per cent of GNP,  one of the highest figures 
in the world,  and protective duties rapidly on the decline- ultimately to zero within the 
EEC- it is hard to conceive of monopolistic prices on a wide scale within Ireland.  There 
are official bodies whose activities are probably effective in keeping prices lower than they 
otherwise would be and in curbing any monopolistic tendencies, namely, the National Prices 
Commission,+  the Restrictive Practices Commission++ and the ·Prices Division of the 
DE'partmfl!nt of Industry and Commerce.  The National Prices Commission advises the 
Minister for Industry and Commerce in fixing maximum prices, and the Restrictive Prac• 
tices Commission has the primary function of holding public inquiries into the conditions 
which obtain in regard to the supply and distribution of goods or the provision of servicesa 
it drafts Fair Practice Rules.  The Prices Division is the recipient of complaints against 
overcharging and has instituted hundreds of prosecutions. 
It is difficult to decide how effective these bodies are, faced,  as we are 
' in Ireland at the moment of writing with the largest rate of inflation in the EE c.  In view 
of the vast numbers of individual goods,  the astronomical number of transactions and the 
fact that there has been a very wide range of percentage price increases during the past 
few years as we have seen, it must be assumed that controls are not completely effective., 
Because of their relation to Other income, we have looked at the trend in retaU prices of 
individual commodities. 
* J. G.  Hughes:  "The Functional Distribution of Incomes in Ireland 1938-1970", ESRI 
Paper No.  65,  1973. 
·+See Appendix 5. 
++See Appendix 8. - 79  -
Agriculture 
Agriculture requires special treatment (supplemental to Chapter 2), 
because of the magnitude of the sector's Other income- 1973 it amounted to £374m.  or 
more than half of total Other income, namely, £736m.  There can be no doUbt but that the 
vast increase in agricultural prices (unit cost) of 90 per cent in the period 1968-1973 - see 
Table 1. 2- far greater than in the case of any other main sector- made a major contribu-
tion to inflation in Ireland.  But this increase was largely due to world prices and  prices 
within EEC,  in particular.  In fact,  it was the principal reason for our adhesion to EEC;· 
I  it was national policy to release the Irish farmer from the age-old British regime of cheap 
food prices.  The point is that most of the vast inflationary rise in agricultural prices was 
due to external causes. 
TherP was a school that believed that the price mechanism,  a most won-
derful automatic regulator of the distribution of goods and services, should not be inter-
fered with,  i. e.  that re-distribution of income was a separate affair,  to be dealt with by 
social security, negative taxation,  etc.  Farmers everywhere,  and Arab oilmen recently, 
ordained otherwise. 
ThP fact that farm price increases are largely imposed from outside the 
economy is no reason for accepting them helplessly,  still less that researchers should not 
study their effects.  To revive an adage last fashionable in Ireland before World War I, 
agricultural redemption is to be sought through quantum·,  not price; price increases are 
al\vays bad for others, if  not for farmers.  And,  as to the second point, we study the reper-
cussions of agricultural price increases on the economy. 
In a paper of the mid-1950s Geary,* from a time series study of agric-
ultural prices and incomes,  tentatively suggested that there might be an inverse relation-
ship in the short term between prices and aggregate quantum output in agriculture, i.e., 
a tendency towards achievement of a steady income.  This, it was surmised, was a global 
result, farmers being sensitive to price rises in i'ndividual products, increasing production 
1n such products but lowering production in others.  A little later this tentative view was 
supported though for England,  by the results of a cross-Aection survP.v from which the 
* ''Variability in Agricultural Statistics on Small and Medium Sized Farming in an Irish 
County."  JSSISI November 1956. - 80  -
author co-ncluded that a practical way for increastng the aggregate volume of agricultural 
output in the UK  was to reduce prices of agricultural products. 
This tendency towards inverse relatio-nship between quantum and price 
in Irish agriculture was interpreted by Geary as a widespread satisfaction with a more-
or-less predetermined low cash income deemed,  in turn, to be a marked weakness on the 
side of demand by agriculturists.  Any  te·ndency to reduce output with increased agricul-
tural prices would have deplorable effects on the economy.  It is another argument in 
favour of curbi'ng these prices. 
Certain it is that in Ireland and England agitation for improved agricul-
tural incomes concentrated o·n prices of product and,  in  so far as there were claims for 
reduction of prices of materials,  the object,  one surmises, was more to enhance margins 
than to increase volume output. 
Whatever enthusiasm Irish farmers ever had for the quantum approach 
to prosperity vanished Uf!-der  the impact of two World Wars,  the only periods during this 
century (save for the last few years) that farmers acquired substantial money incomes. 
It is also relevant that,  so far as home markets are concerned,  the price elasticity for 
Irish farm products is generally low,  i. e.  a reduction (absolute or relative) in price will 
not necessarily result in a substantial increase in home sales; of course, this is not true 
of exports. 
To repeat, we regard agricultural prices as a major threat to inflation, 
at least tn the near future.  This "income redemption through price" attitude is by no 
means confined to Ireland.  It seems to be largely that of CAP. 
One wo·nders if it is suited to Ireland,  even apart from its harmful 
effect on inflation.  It has often being stated that in parts of Ireland there is the finest 
agricultural land on  earth and  that quantum output potential (physical if not economic) is 
somf'thing like twice what it is now.  We (and CAP)  seem to have accepted that the only 
way towards equality of income, farm with non-farm, is reduction of numbers on farms. 
In our view it seems doubtful if full employment can ever be attained in 
Irelan~ if non - AFF sectors are to cope with this agricultural surplus of manpower.  At 
least in Ireland if not elsewhere in EEC there is a strong case for maintaining, if  not - 81-
incl;reasing,  numbers engaged in AFF,  of course through increased production  • 
.,;  Of course,  existing surplus production in EEC is no answer,  those "mountains" 
of \teef,  butter,  milk powder etc,  deemed due to errors in pricing policy.  To accept this 
argument is to ignore that two-thirds of the world is stated to be near starvation.  Tore-
vive the clich~: "the problem is one of distribution not of production".  Europe,  North 
America and the Antipodes have more of their world share of developable land, hence also 
responsibilities towards the hungry world. 
We recommend that AFT and ESRI combine on a comprehensive study for a policy 
for1agriculture,  forestry and fishing in Ireland.  Recommendations therefrom might have 
their effect on CAP of EEC. 
But to end this section we feel we should call attention to the very recent expert 
opiiUon of S. J. Sheehy enshrined in the following quotations:-* 
"Our Irish represe·ntatives have fought single mindedly 
for the highest possible prices for farm produce ••• " 
The CAP provides an excellent framework for Irish 
agriculture.  We must,  however,  take a more positive 
approach to the rationalisation of the CAP,  lest in ex-
ploiting the CAP for short-term gai·n we kill the goose 
that is laying the golden egg". 
We agree- as applicable to the very recent period and the future. 
Noo--agricultural Policy 
One wonders whether somethtng of the kind (i.e.  a preference for a price to a 
quaatum route to better income),  in conditions of rampant inflation obtains in ·non-agricul-
ture.  The theoretical assumption is that all managements try to maximise profit.  Do 
they,  in fact?  It is virtuous to obtain profit through large output and low prices.  Is this 
always what happens?  Clearly industrial pricing policy and experience require examination. 
Within their firms,  managements (as distinct from employees and shareholders) 
h1ivt absolute power of decision as to prices at which goods and  services are offered, which 
decision will,  of course, be influenced by competitive prices and other considerations. 
*  lt!sh Times, 11 May 1976. - 82  -
Ordinary observation goes to show that, contrary to the usual theoretical assumption, a 
wide range of prices can obtain at any given time for a given description of good,  not etc-
plicable by transport costs etc.  Also,  a small difference in product price may mean' 
large difference in profit; and,  as degree of inflation increases, purchaser resistance io 
pricf' increase lowers.  In all these circumstances, many managements must seek solace 
in marginal price increases rather than in enhanced sale volume, with all the trouble  · 
associated therewith.  There are fewer coronaries in the price approach. 
Geary and Pratschke* suggested also that inflation may be necessary 
for economic development under modern conditions: their only supporting argument 
was the negative one (or perhaps the "zero" one) that a price standstill would spell wide-
sprf'ad ruin.  In the early oost-Keynesian days some expressed a liking for "a small .rice 
rise" (carefully avoiding assessment of the magnitude of "small") to which the more per-
cipient were wont to reply:  "The notion of a small price rise is about as sensible as ltat 
of a small pregnancy".  How right the latter were : 
The point of the foregoing remarks is that the widespread idea of "fe7 
demption through price" may be a leading cause of inflation resulting,  ultimately,  in disaster 
(i.e.  of the currency unit).  Until disaster,  there seems to be no strong countervail!~ 
force operating. 
Prices not Incomes 
We here state our firm conviction that,  as between price and inc~e 
control,  the better way to curb inflation is direct action on prices, involving,  of courste, 
indirect action on incomes.  So,  more or less existing levels of money income will im-
prove in real value.  Direct action on money incomes must lead to political and  social 
trouble. 
In the creation of N  PC and other bodies designed to control prices,
1 this 
is obviously the official attitude.  Have their actions been effective in the sense that prices 
would have been higher without them?  They clearly have not been sufficient. 
The State and Non-employee Income 
The State,  regarded as an entity,  is the major monopolist in Irelalld as 
*  op. cit. - 8~ -
ererwhere else.  It is capable of earning Other income,  as the difference between its 
~eipts  from taxation, fees and marketing services less costs of labour and of goods and 
atrvices.  At the start, we decided that the State came within our terms of reference but 
felt that the task of analysis was beyond our resources of time, money and  talent.  We 
must be content to recommend that an i'ndependent,  full scale, research inquiry be made 
iuto the extent of the contribution of State activity to inflation,  and how this might be miti-
gated in future. 
Who are to Blame for Infiation? 
We had no intention of converting this study into a search for guilty men, 
whether these be deemed to be workpeople ("greed"), managements ("profiteers") or 
governments ("profiigate spendthrifts").  We took this negative attitude not from pusill-
aDlmity but from the conviction that all of us are to blame, which may be another way of 
saying that none of us are to blame.  What seems clear is that sacrifices must be made by 
all if  inflation is to be curbed. 
Workpeople and their unions are usually cast in the blameworthy role, 
for more or less the showing of Chart 1.  Their gains are well ahead of those of Other 
ineome earners, our main interest.  Yet, if  this advantageous situation obtains,  may it 
not be inherent as the outcome of free collective bargaining, equitable as a progress 
tot~ards less social inequality?  In an inflationary situation there are few  safeguards; 
there is one here.  H earnings go beyond a certain level, production must fall and un-
eaployment transpire.  One can easily envisage a situation in which average earnings of 
elllployees at work and out of work have declined because of inordi'nate demands for in-
creased earnings; NIEC was strongly of this opinion in the 1960s  when i'nflation was far 
leis serious than it is now.  Something like this may be happening i'n Ireland at the moment. 
EIC Prices and Inflation 
There are newspapers reports (as well as reports by tourists) that re-
tail prices in Britain and Ireland are generally lower than in other EEC countries and,  as 
we knOW',  British and Irish prices are increasi'ng faster than elsewhere i'n the Community. 
Tbese facts are consistent with British and Irish prices tending towards equality with the 
otlers, to be expected with increasing trade and other links between EE C countries.  This 
is surmise, but,  to the extent that it is true, it offers but a gloomy prospect for an early - 84-
substantial mitigation of inflation tn Britain and Ireland.  In the long run it may be dif-· 
ferent: the success of the rest of EEC in levelling off prices must have a corresponding·: 
effect on British-Irish prices unless,  of course, the sterling exchange rate continues its 
present downward trend. 
The Present Inquiry 
Our initial thinking therefore produced (i) a strong ·negative hypothesis 
which we regard as sustained,  (ii) suggestions for inquiry into agriculture and the public 
service mainly with a view to mitigation of the impact of these great sectors on inflatioa. 
We have provided data and a train of argument about both. 
In the event our approach was statistical, involving analyses of all avail-
able statistics on the different sectors of the economy,  some of these statistics admittedly 
with but slim relationship to our subject of inquiry, ·namely, the effect on i'nflation of Other 
income.  At the end of each chapter we state our conclusions on what we believe to be the 
clear showing of the statistics.* 
Our opening hypothesis might be paraphrased: in the mai'n,eamers of 
Other income are affected by inflation but are not the cause of it.  In our analyses we  i 
have found nothing to disprove this thesis at the macro level. 
We base this conclusion on the relative trends in unit costs of employee 
remuneration and  of Other income,  especially in 1974.  Amongst macro sectors, it is 
only in the case of agriculture that the latter exceeded the former in recent years,  and 
here this effect is partly due to decline in number of employees, but mainly to relative 
trends in cost of prices of products and materials,  over which Irish farmers have little 
or no control. 
The foregoing finding,  even without appeal to statistics,  should be im._ 
pregnable for a small country with relatively large export and import trades,  assuming 
perfect competition.  But to what extent is the latter the case?  Have Irish producers : 
special markets or special products which give them some control over the prices at wflich 
they sell?  Have exporters different prices for home sales and exports?  We may state 
that ESRI has under active consideration a proposal to investigate on a sample basis Irish 
*  All our findings are not in these very brief "conclusions".  We hope that readers will 
find some value in our results in themselves,  even if  but dimly relevant to our the~. - 85  -
illldustrialists reaction to economic change,  of which the degree, if any,  of imperfect com-
petition, would be very much a part.  In the meantime,  our conclusion sta:nds. 
Econometrics 
Our main finding i. e.  that by and large Other income in Ireland is not a cause 
of inflation is so essentially simple that we hesitate to submit it to sophisticated investiga-
tiOil.  However,  in Appendix 3 we have begun investigation on  a simple and elegant beha-
viouristic system of simultaneous equations due to G.  Ti'ntner.  All that we claim for it in 
application is that the showing is reasonably close to what has happened recently in Ireland. 
We recognise that the Cobb-Douglas postulated as a production function is not 
suitable for the present inquiry because of its implication of a constant ratio in time of 
employee remuneration to Other income. *  In fact our approach,  on the contrary, has 
shown that there have been difterences in trend,  especially when the data are examined in 
differe·nt sectors.  Another production function allowing for variation in the ratio might be 
substituted for the Cobb-Douglas.  Perhaps also some of the functions now regarded as 
e:x;os might be converted into current endos with a corresponding number of equations 
added.  All we can claim now is that the system may merit some further elaboration. 
We  confess to some doubt about the value of this approach  for helping with the 
pnesent problem.  For example,  if we decide to regard employee income as endogenous 
and furnish it with a causal equation,  as c&used,  say, by CPI and  other variables we beg a 
large question at the start. 
COilcluding Reflections 
The main conclusion of the study is that few earners of non-employee income 
have any control over their level of income,  (in so far as this depends on the prices of 
labour products and materials) except as regards level of activity.  This is a corollary of 
the fact that Other income is essentially a residue,  the difference between selling value and 
colts, including cost of labour,  over the level of which,  price-wise, the enterpriser has 
little influence,  unless he be a monopolist in whole or in part.  Such cases must be rare 
in Ireland with its relatively vast foreign trade and the reasonably effective and wide-rang-
ing activities of the NPC. +  As price control must be more effective at factory level,  one 
*  See Appendix 4. 
+ lee Appendix 4. - 86  -
must be doubtful about the efficiency of cO"ntrol  of costs of distribution (even though these 
come with the ambit of NPC), our investigation of retail trade shows no tendency towardl 
an increase in percentage mark-up, if admittedly the period of reference of our data is 
somewhat remote- see Chapter 3. 
Our general approach i'n this study'has been to compare price or unit cost 
trends associated with non-employee income with CPI and/or employee unit costs trendl, in 
so far as this was possible.  If the trend of Other income in a particular occupational or 
industrial group was lower than either or both the other series, we would decide that it 
would not be necessary to try to find out if conditions conducive to over-pricing had cha:Ji-
ged for the worse under the conditions obtaining in the group.  Obviously it  would be ex• 
tremely difficult to obtain information on the latter aspect on anything like a comprehen.:. 
sive scale.  We consider that unfair pricing, in the aggregate, is on a small scale. 
Our residue theory,  as applying to Other income in the private sector implies 
that if inflation be curbed generally, i. e. if  the rate of increase in prices of goods and 
services and unit costs of employee incomes be reduced,  the trend in unit cost of Other. 
income will take care of itself: any tendency in the latter to increase unduly in general cir 
in particular will be fortuitous.  To repeat: the rise in Other income is an effect, not a 
cause,  of inflation. 
Hence any suggestion we might make would bear on general inflation. 
I 
As every 
government is actively engaged in the task of curbing inflation,  and every economist thi'ik-
ing about it, it may seem temerarious O'n  our part to enter the fight against infiation.  We 
do not think so because our proposal is so obvious and unoriginal. 
It is: strive to attain a substantial increase in exports, mainly by making export 
prices "more competitive", i.e. lower.  Ireland has relatively one of the largest expo~ 
trades in the world,  so that way is already lighted for us.  Probably the basis of the 
marked rise of trend i'n the country's prosperity that began in the late 1950s and e·arly 1~60s 
was the rise in exports.  Still,  our income per head is the lowest amongst our EEC pa~­
ners, less than half that of the most prosperous. 
The price elasticity of demand for exports from this small country is very l~rge. 
This means that a small reductiO'n in price may result in a large increase in volume of· ex-
ports thus with a lowering in unemployment.  Of course, price reduction of goods and  &~er-- 87-
vices exported is not enough; fortunately we possess a large volume of tale·nt in the arts 
of Blarketing abroad no doubt capable of expansion. 
We  suggest that price reduction absolutely or relatively can best be realized 
by people's working harder and more skilfully, ·not only those directly engaged in export 
indllstrles but all workers.  Such an end can be achieved only by a national campaign 
against inflation,  showing what an evil it is, cheating most of the people most of the time. 
We admit that we are not optimistic about this suggestion being adopted. 
There is a difficulty to be faced here.  If  wages are curbed it seems that,  in 
equt.ty,  so must Other incomes.  But decision as to increased economic activity in the 
private sector, as we have so often stated, remains absolutely with recipients of Other 
income, impelled mainly by the profit motive. 
Of course there are ways of coping.  We  suggest this only.  Nothing is more 
Uk.ely to convince Other income earners of better times to come (  i. e. better rewards in 
futare) than a disposition on the part of employees to make sacrifices in the present hard 
times. 
Many times we have had to insist on the extent to which our small country must 
ac•pt world prices for what we buy and  sell.  If  we accept this position absolutely, i. e. 
to produce and consume goods to a world pattern·,  surely our economic future is dubious, 
in tompetition with low cost and large scale producers.  Why  should we not produce,  on 
a far larger scale than at present, goods recognised internationally as specifically Irish, 
even luxury goods for a world becoming wealthier? A
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Appendix  2 
Correction of 1966 CD Data for Taxatio·n 
In the case of those ratios involving gross margin,  a problem of comparability 
·  lrises.  According to the Census of Distribution definition,  gross margin equals "Total 
Sales less Purchases plus increases in Stocks"; moreover,  respondents are instructed to 
"include any payments to suppliers in respect of turnover tax and wholesale tax" i'n the 
value of their purchases,  and to "include receipts from customers for turnover tax and 
wholesale tax" in the value of their sales.  He·nce  "gross margin" includes any sums in 
respect of turnover tax and wholesale tax which the retailer is required to remit to the 
Revenue Commissioners.  Whether a retailer is liable to remit such sums depends on 
whether he is registered with the Revenue Commissioners for the purposes of the sales 
taxes; if  he is, he can make all purchases for his stock in trade (in so far as they are not 
already gross of sales taxes) free of tax,  and will be liable to remit the tax on sale. 
Turnover tax was levied at a rate of 2!% in 196f; on almost all sales of goods 
·and services; wholesale tax was levied,  on a narrower range of goods and  services from 1 
October 1966,  at a rate of 5%.  Both taxes were levied on the selling price inclusive of 
tax.  If  we are aiming, with gross margin, at a measure of value added by the retailer 
fin fact,  it includes, in addition to certain sales taxes, rather more than value added),  it 
will be necessary to deduct any amounts included in respect of sales taxes.  These amounts 
were estimated as follows: (i) it was assumed that turnover tax applied to the entire turn-
over of Census respondents,  though this turnover includes a small amount of sales by 
.,holesale; and that the full amount of this tax was included in their reported gross margins; 
the latter part of this assumption implies that all sales were made to persons who were not 
registered for turnover tax by retailers who were,  supplied entirely by suppliers who in 
their turn were registered; this assumption is justified by the number of registered outlets 
In 1966/67 compared with the number of Census respondents.  (ii) In view of the narrower 
range of goods covered by wholesale tax,  the small number of registrations in 1966/67 
·the small sum collected from its operation tn the period 1 October 1966 to 31  March 1967 
wholesale tax was ignored.  Thus the burden of turnover tax is overestimated,  and  that of 
wholesale tax neglected; the errors tend to cancel, leaving a probable net overestimate of 
the tax burden,  and a consequent small underestimation of margins in 1966. - 90-
Gross margin net of turnover and wholesale taxes is, in the text 
proper, implied by the term "gross margin". 
In calculating those ratios involving sales, it has been decided to use 
sales net of turnover tax.  No such correction has been or can be made for other indirect 
taxes, which are, with some exceptions (e. g.  rates) not included in reported GM.  Accol!-
dingly the value of those ratios involving sales will differ according as Government in-
creases its revenue from indirect taxes by means of the turnover tax or otherwise. 
The figures for the ratio of gross margin to sales in Table 4. 3 are 
corrected in a similar fashion to those in Table 4. 2 involving retailers' margins.  It 
should be noted that from May 1 1970 the turnover tax was doubled to 5 per cent,  aDd  con-, 
sequently a weighted average of the two rates was used in correcting 1970 figures.  A 
more serious reservation in regard to the figures for 1967-1970 is that no correction for 
wholesale tax is made.  While this procedure is acceptable in relation to 1966,  during 
which the wholesale tax applied for a short time only.  the fact of a downward trend in gro•s 
margins as a proportion of sales may be disguised in Table 3.  It seems likely,  however~ 
that Table 3. 3 establishes a point,  while further refinement of it would,  owing to the restJlc-
ted scope of the wholesale tax,  and ignorance of the proportion of retailers' purchases free 
, of wholesale tax,  be conjectural. - 91  -
Appendix  3 
The Algebra of Input-Output Price Changes 
The basic method of analysis is as follows: If there are n industrial 
lectors, m primary input factors,  then the basic pricing equations are 
n  m 
~  piaij + £  l.kbkj =  P ;  j =  1, •••.•.••.•.•  n 
i=1  k=1 
or in matrix form. 
p'  A + 7:  'B =  p' 
"'""'  -- -
where PI is the price of the product in ~ach industrial sector; A  the matrix of inter-indus-
try input coefficients;  7:  ~ the price of a primary input,  and ~  the matrix of industry 
pnmary input coefficients.  Note that we may always include the primary inputs them-
eelves as outputs of industrial sectors, e. g. if  all primary inputs are to be viewed as out-
puts, we have aij = o,  all i, j  '  m, bij =CO ij; i, j  6  m, where the first m outputs are 
~e  "primary" goods.  This of course implies pi = 1i  1  i '- m. 
Solving for E', we have 
-1 
p' =  ii  'B ti- A\ 
- - -vv  ;.:; 
A price index,  e. g.  the C PI.,  is then viewed as simply a weighted sum of the price 
vector ,e',  say P =  .2'~ a scalar, where b, is the column vector of household weights, hence 
•  have, 
-1 
P =  p'h =  ":r  'B (I- A\  h 
IV- - - - ;.;/  -
It is convenient to deal with price changes (indicated by the prefix 4  ) , 
prices being regarded in each time interval as index numbers to base unity in the year of 
I•O (here 1969).  We also allow in what follows for primary input in households. 
In fact,  assume that price changes (with 1969 as 1) for each primary in-
put are the same for all 33 sectors, namely,A 'iii (hence a scalar) for primary input i. 
Let Ja'i be the row vector of coefficients for primary input i, ,2. the unitized (i.e. column 
111m to 1) I-0 household consumption vector, ,9
1 the interindu~try part of l  and,82i (a scalar) 
~e  element of ,S for primary input i.  Then if  6Pi a scalar, be the change (1969 as 1) in 
Jlrice of household consumption between 1969 and any other year, - Q?  -
Changes shown were readily calculated from this formula,  the scalar values 
-1 
.2'i<!- !:,)  ll1 + h21  (which,  over i, sum to unity),*  being given. 
Percentages do not always exactly add because of rounding.  If  AP is the resulting 
change in the price of household consumption, it is evident that 
k 
LlP=  £  .d Pi 
i=l 
as used in the table.  For application,  see Notes to Table 5.1. 
* See E. W.  Henry,''Irish Input-Output Structures 1964 and  1968",  (ESRI Paper No.  66,, 
1972),  Appendix 1. 
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Appendix  4 
A Macro Behaviouristic System 
Our model is simple and elegant,  due to G.  Tintner, which he des-
aribes as a "highly aggregated Keynesian model". * 
Endogenous Variables (  e·ndovars): 
C = Private consumption (current) 
Y =  GNP (current) 
P = Implicit GNP price index 
X = GNP (constant price) 
+  D = Employment 
:§i!ogenous variables (exovars): 
j'• 
N = Population 
G = Public consumption (current) 
I  = Gross investment (current) 
L = Change in stocks (curre·nt) 
E = Exports (current) 
M= Imports (current) 
K = Capital stock (constant price) 
W = Annual income per employee (current) 
All  interesting feature of this model is its regarding average employee compensation (W) 
ae exoge·nous.  Taking a strict view,  scarcely any economic variables are entirely exo-· 
genous but we agree with Tintner that under modem conditions the wage rate has more the 
character of an exovar.  For reasons which will presently appear,  our main interest, 
namely, non-employee income, does not appear explicitly in this model.  Following Tintner, 
we do not regard the model as stochastic.  Data are annual.  In what follows we omit the 
subscript t, i. e.  "Ct" etc. will be written "C".  The five equations are ... 
* 
+ 
G.  Ttntner:  "A Simple Aggregate Model for Austria".  Mimeograph memorandum of 
the Institut for Okonometrie,  Techniche Hochschule Wien. 
Contrary to our practice elsewhere, we here include in "employment" independent and 
family workers.  "Employee" income DW is correspondingly changed. (1)  A consumption function:  ....2_  =a+  b L 
NP  NP 
(2)  Definition of GNP: Y = C + Q 
with Q =  G + I + L + E - M.  All on the right are exovars, Q therefore being regard$~ 
as a single variable, greatly simplifying the algebra. 
y 
(3)  GNP at constant prices:  X=  P 
tOx  w 
(  4)  Demand for labour: 
6 
D  = P 
A  Cobb-Douglas production function: 
(  5)  log X =  d + f log D + g log K 
From (1)  and (2),  C/NP and Y/NP may be expressed in terms of Q/NP, i.e. in reduced 
form.  Each equation is solved by least squares and by reverse substitution a and b are 
found.  Tintner uses the following neat device to estimate fin (5).  From (5),  by partial 
differentiation, 
D  •  'X  -f 
X  6D  - • 
Then using (4),  f =  DW/PX.  Log f is estimated as the arithmetic mean of (log D +log w;-
log P- log X)  over all the observations.  Such an estimate of log f may be regarded as cen-
sistent, under general conditions.  For scale reasons g is estimated as (1  - f).  We  sh~ 
not be concerned with the constant d. 
The system as a whole is non-linear so cannot conveniently be expressted 
; in reduced form,  i. e.  each endovar in terms of the exovars.  This, however, is quite easy 
, if  we linearize the system by postulating "small changes" whereby all the variables become 
6  (log C)= 6 C/C etc,  6 C being small, including the exovars. 
Table A4.1:  Linearized reduced form of Gerhard Tintner's aggregate model for Austria.·~ 
& N/N  SW/W  6 Q/Q  bK/K  ~ 
n  P/P  a (1 -f) N/F  (1- b) fX/F  (1- f) Q/PF  -(1- b) gX/F 
i 
bY/Y  aN/F  afN/F  Q/PF  -afN/F 
Sx,tx  afN/F  (aN - T=""'x)f/F  fQ/PE  a (aN - ~  bX)g/F  ~ 
bC/C  aNPX/CF  afNPX/CF  (al- fn + bX)Q/CF  -afNPX/CF 
OR/R  aN/F  afN/L  Q/PF  -afN/F 
SD/D  aN/F  (aN- r=Dx)/F  Q/PF  -agN/F reasons. 
- 95-
Notes to Table A4. 1 
F =- a (1  - f) N + (1  - b) X 
R = Y - DW =  (1 - f)  Y =  gY 
The coefficients for dR/R are identical with those for dY/Y for obvious 
Adopting a slightly different, but easily reconcilable, approach from 
Tintner's we show in Table A4.1 the reduced form of the "small change" linearized model. 
The presence of endovars in the coefficients may seem strange,  at first sight; less so, if 
we refiect that the model purports to show what the values of the small changes in the & 
(log endovars) would be,  given the  G (log exovars),  the system having initially the values 
of the variables shown in the tables.  In application,  values of each of the five exovars 
Involved will be substituted for Q in the fourth column of Table A4.1. 
An intriguing feature of the model is the absence of capital stock K in the 
formulae for the coefficients in Table A4.1. a fortunate circumstance in view of the dubious 
1tatistical quality of our estimates therefore.  The reason: K is not required for the cal-
culation of f and g in the Cobb-Douglas and the  6 -treatment eliminated the constant d. 
In this sytem, non-employee income R would be Y-DW :a gY,  i.e. pro-
portionality of employee and non-employee income in added value is strictly preserved. 
This means that the reduced form coefficients appropriate to R are identical with those of 
Y. 
WhUe this assumption of constancy is oversimplifed in its application 
to Ireland (in fact the hypothesis is discussed elsewhere in the paper), it is not so implau-
lible as to vitiate the results we present in Table  A4. 2. - 96  -
Table A4. 2:  Tintner's elasticities for Ireland, for mean of years 1958-1974. 
Exovar log  Endovar log change 
change  oC/C  SY/Y  f,P/P  Sx/X  SD/D 
ON/N  o. 55  o. 41  0.14  0.27  0.41 
6G/G  0.29  o. 37  0.12  0.24  o. 37 
ni/1  o. 43  0.54  0.18  o. 36  0.54 
f,L/L  0.04  0.05  0.02  0.03  0.05 
6E/E  o. 81  1.00  0.34  0.67  1. 00 
f)M/M  -0.93  -1.16  -0.39  -0.77  -1.16 
6K/K  -0.19  -0.14  -0.38  0.25  -0.14 
COw/W  0.37  0.27  0.75  -0.48  -0.73 
Notes 
This table was constructed from the formulae tn Table A4.1 with variables 
given their mean values for the seventeen years 1958-1974.  Data was therefore as 
follows:-
Parameters 
a= 81.0773 
b =  o. 540405 
f =  o. 66324 
The table means that,  e. g.  -
6 ~  = o. 55  s  ~ + o. 29 
Means 
E·ndovars 
a  =  £923. 9 million 
y = £1,322.8 
P = o. 8735 (1970 as 1) 
X = £1, 424. 1 million 
i5 =  1. 060 million 
so 
G +.I. + o. 37  6W 
w 
Exovars 
N  = 2. 910 million 
a= £183.5  " 
I  = £269. 8  " 
I,= £24.8  " 
E =  £504.3  " 
M =  £583.4  " 
K =  £2, 305. 1 million 
w  = £839.5  " 
so that the colum·ns represent the linear reduced forms of the five endovars when changes 
tn the exovars are small. - 97-
All the basic variables,  except K and N for 1958-1973 are from issues of 
CSO'a National Income and Expenditure; 1974 values are from the March 1975 issue of 
the ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary by J. Durkan and F. Kirwan.  Estimates of 
N were supplied by CSO  (End of Notes to Table A4.2). 
Table A4. 2 shows all the elasticities of the system, e. g. the first value o. 55 
meana that ceteris paribus a rise of one per cent in population results in a rise of 0. 55 
per cent in private consumption at current prices.  There are,  of course,  many regular-
ities In Table A4.2 (obvious from the formulae in Table A4.1): e.g. the  ~X/X  column 
equala the S  Y/Y column minus  the t>P/P column and all column entries for the Q-set 
are in proportion,  except for rounding. 
Without too much stress on the results of so simple a model and mentioning 
only pneral tendencies rather than actual values,  we find-
(i)  Increases of one per cent in  members of the Q-set (except imports) have 
positive percentage effects on the endovars. 
(ii)  As expected from their magnitudes exports and imports have the largest 
elasticities  • 
(iii) Increase in capital stock lowers prices and increases volume of GNP. 
(iv)  Increase in money wages substantially increases prices and volume of 
GNP  and reduces (in greater .proportion) employment. 
In light of recent Irish experience,  there is little to cavil at in these inferences 
from the model.  Still,  we must be on our guard,  mindful of.the econometric warning: 
one is liable to get from a model what one puts into it. 
We  have not provided a column of Other income R = gY in Table A4. 2 
becauae,  as is evident from Table A4.1 the values would be identical with those in the 
OY/Y column. 
In Table A4. 3 we compare actual with predictions from the model for all 
five endovar unity increases, S  P/P etc. for 1971-72,  1972-73 and 1973-74.  For pre-
dictioa Table A4.1 formulae were used,  variables P etc. being taken as means (P  0 
+ P 1)/2 
etc. and unitary changes as 2 (P  1 - P 0
)/(P  0 + P 1>· - 98  -
Table A4. 3:  Unitary Changes in Endovars (i) Actual and (it) Predicted  from Table J\4.1 
1971-72, 1972-73 and 1973-·74 
1971-72  1972-73 
A  p  A 
Sg  .122  .171  o129  p 
sx  o167  • 219  o179  y 
8~  .046  • 048  0  050 
X 
SD  -.008  0  038  +.005  D 
Sc  .137  • 095  .179  c 
SR  o144  • 219  • 209  R 
A: Actual 
P: Predicted from model using Table A4.1 
Note: 
For method of calculation see text. 
1973-74 
p  A  p 
o168  0  081  .059 
.184  • 083  .040 
• 017  0  002  -.015 
-.003  • 007  .096 
.172  .136  • 044 
.184  .071  .040 
Except for 1972-73 the model cannot be regarded as very successful, 
perhaps because of its simplicity and of the estimates taken for B P/P etc.  The predicted 
figures for  S R/R are the same as those for  6 Y  /Y.  The exercise may prove useful for 
comparison with results from other models. - 99-
Appendix 5 
The Work of the National Prices Commission* 
Under the Prices Acts (1958-1972) the Minister for Industry and  Com-
merce has powers (i) to tnvestigate all prices and charges, including charges for profes-
siOilal services, and to fix maxima for, or freeze such prices; (ii) to investigate and con-
trol the margins of distributors of all sorts; (iii) various auxiliary  powers in connection 
with these functions.  Certain goods and  services are excluded fro·m the scope of the 
Prices Acts,  the most important of which are 
(a)  activities carried on by or on behalf of a Minister of State (including the 
activities of state-sponsored bodies); 
(b)  primary agricultural products (includtng eggs,  poultry,  milk and milk pro-
ducts) and horticultural products; 
(c)  commodities for export; 
(d)  banking services; 
(e)  housing; 
The National Prices Commission is an advisory body established by the 
Mblister under the Prices Acts.  In addition to the above exclusions, (which have not how-
ever,  prevented the Commission from commenting on some of the excluded activities), the 
following are exempt from detailed price control: 
(f)  firms exporting 25%  or more of their output of a product, if the average 
delivered cost excluding taxes on the British market is not less than the 
domestic price; 
(g)  firms producing transportable goods which employ not more than 20  people 
or the turnover of which is less than £150, 000; 
(h)  all laundries and similar establishments; 
(i)  animal feeclstuffs and fertilisers. 
In addition it is stated in the Reports that there are some sectors where price co·ntrols are 
laqely ineffective,  e. g.  personal and professional services,  or where, due to continual 
* The Commission has rece·ntly recommended a substantial modification of the structure 
of price control, which however involves no departure from its basic principle.  The 
proposal is that price control concentrate on those firms which are considered to have 
a dominant position in an industry. - 100 -
changes i'n products, inapplicable,  e. g.  footwear,  clothing,  textiles and furniture. 
In deciding whether to allow a claim for a price increase, the Com-
mission will exclude for the purposes of the claim any increase in wages and  salaries in 
excess of Government guidelines (based on the National Wage Agreement),  and will require 
a certain absorption of costs through productivity increases, the amount of this absorptipn 
varying with economic conditions. 
following terms: 
The Commission summarizes its approach to price control in the 
''When enough firms are competing with each other 
or where there is growing competition from imports, 
market forces will generally put pressure on firms 
to improve their efficie·ncy and so moderate the rise 
in prices following increases in costs.  In this kind 
of situation we envisage that our role will be limited 
and our general aim would be to strengthen market 
forces.  Our mai·n interest will be in cases where 
there is one firm (whether in the public or private 
sect<'r) or a few firms or a dominant firm in an in-
dustry, or where competition from imports is absent 
or limited or where competition seems for any reason 
to be restricted.  Here, price surveillance is impor-
tant,  because firms so placed have a wider discretion 
in their pricing policies".  (Report No.  1, 1971) 
In the particular case of retail prices it states: 
''Whatever form of co·ntrol over retail margins is applied,-
efforts must be maintained to make competition more 
effective.  If this is to be achieved,  the flows of infor-
mation to both buyer and  seller must be improved.  The 
better the flow of information,  the better the quality of 
competition and the more efficient the system".  (Report 
No.  40,  1975). 
The Commission sees its task as mitigating the detrimental symptoms of inflation rathef 
than the basic causes, the control of which is a matter for Government and other agencies. 
In regard to those basic causes it rejects the view that more than a part of Irish inflation 
is imported,  and continues: 
"Some argue that the main domestic contribution to in-
flation has come from excess demand for goods and 
services, generated by fiscal and/or monetary influences. 
Others argue that prices have been pushed up by the up-- 101-
ward pressure on wages and salaries exerted by trade unions.  The 
available evidence seems to favour the first explanation - that prices 
have risen faster in Ireland than in neighbourlng countries as a result 
of a combination of excess demand and expectations of further price 
increases.  Excess demand has been created (or has emerged) on 
a number of occasions by a rapid growth of Government expenditure 
and of Government borrowing from external sources or from the 
banking system.  As a result of this excess demand, Irish wages 
and costs have risen faster than they would otherwise have done. 
And  expectations of price increases have bee·n created which have 
sustained the inflationary process during the (usually brief) periods 
when demand has not been excessive".  (Report No.  36,  1975). 
From its inception to May 1975,  the Commission has dealt with 2, 628 claims,  of which 
2. 6% have been rejected,  48.4% accepted in part,  and  the balance accepted in full.  In the 
two years to May 1975,  of £266. 5 million of increased annual costs claimed,  £211.7 mil-
li~  was actually allowed.  This leads to the conclusion that the prices of the products and 
services covered by these claims rose by about 21% less than they would have done in the 
absence of price co·ntrol.  Moreover, when one considers that most Commission recomm-
e·ndations relate to ex-factory prices, which bear a retailer's percentage markup,  and  that 
waae increases in excess of the Government guideUnes may not have been _glaimed,  the true 
saYing may well have been greater.  However it is quite possible that there has been a ten-
dency for applicants to the Commission to submit claims in excess of an amount acceptable 
to themselves; the greater the extent of this practice, the less has bee·n the saving to con-
~< 
sumers as a result of the Commission's activities.  Also, it is probable that the enforce-
ment of a maximum permissible price will be at a level required to keep the less efficient 
producers in business,  -and that this price will come to be regarded as the minimum price 
which even the more efficient will observe.  Indeed it was for these reasons that the Com-
milsion rejected the extension of the system of maximum price orders as a means of con-
trolling retail prices. A
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Appendix 7 
Orthopols Fitted to Log (CPI) and  Log (TGER) 
The curves are as follows:-
2  ~'  4  _]'  1958-1968:  log10 CPI =  1. 9105 + • 0  1892....J
1 
+,  0. 5099 
2 + e 
2  ,  '  4  .J'  1969-1974:  log10 CPI =  2.1222 + •  0  5381_}
1 + •  0  7697 
2 + e 
2  _]'  ]'  1958-1968:  log10 TGER = 1. 8190 + • 0  3951 
1 +.  02389 
2 + e 
2  '  3  .J'  1969-1974:  log10 TGER =  2.1815 + • 0  8288 :)1 +.  0  18662 
2 + e 
No.  of obs. 
44 
24 
44 
22 
'  '  In the notation of Fisher-Yates* _]
1 
and  .J
2 
are the first and  second orthopols, i.e. 
functions of the first and second degree in time t.  The operations are equivalent to 
fitting OIB regressions in the linear and quadratic terms in time t.  The time inter-
val is one quarter,  time being centred at the middle of the respective time periods. 
Significance 
As regards curvature (i. e.  as determined by the coefficients of 
3~), which is the propensity to increase at an increasing rate, the fitted curves 
have the following characteristics:-
log (CPI) 
log (TGER) 
Prob.  significance in period-
1958-1968  1969-1974 
***  *** 
*  * 
Critical null-hypothesis probabilities P:-
***:P.t..001;  **:.001L.PL..01;  *:.01LPL.05. 
Curvature,  always positive, was much more marked in the case 
of prices, i.e.,  prices  tended to increase at a more constant rate in each of the 
two periods envisaged than did earnings. 
* R. A.  Fisher and F. Yates:  Statistical Tables for Biological, Agricultural 
and Medical Research, 1957, - 106  -
In all four comparisons, coefficients were larger in the later period 
than in the earlier.  Probably in a non-statistical sense all  four changes were signifi-
cant.  Statistically regarded, however, null-hypothesis significances for changes 
were as follows:-
log (CPI) 
log (TGER) 
Linear term 
*** 
*** 
Quadratic term 
not significant 
not significant 
..  .. "Ex ante Thinking" 
- 1()7  -
Appendix 8 
by 
J.J. Walsh 
It may be of interest to mention an effect of inflation in a period of 
recession on prices and profits.  If demand is falling and with it a firm's output, 
overheads per unit of output will rise with constant prices of inputs.  If the prices 
of inputs are also rising the effect on unit overhead costs is, of course, all the 
greater.  Manufacturers are usually reluctant to make workers - particularly 
lkilled workers - redundant.  There is likely to be a period when there is a reduc-
tion in overtime, or shift working,  or even in normal working hours.  The duration 
of the period before the work-force is reduced when output is falling will vary from 
one firm to another for a number of reasons.  Over this period, however,  labour 
costs per unit of output will tend. to increase, adding to the effect of any increase 
In wages.  You rightly say that to a considerable degree throughout the economy 
the offering price is cost plus.  I am inclined to view that price-leaders, brand 
leaders, and indeed manufacturers of widely accepted brands (e. g.  certain pro-
cessed foods,  drugs, cars and television sets) are each faced with a range of 
.j 
prices, which I think of as the competitive price band, within which a particular 
product is competitive with relatively slight effects on volume of sales.  This 
situation reflects the existence of imperfect competition, influenced by advertising, 
brand goodwill,  custom and  reluctance to change (brands or possibly suppliers). 
Ill times of severe inflation the competitive price band tends to widen.  This, I 
believe, is due to the buyer's expectation of frequent price increases coupled with 
the blurring of a framework of reference prices established in the minds of con-
IUmers in periods of relative price stability.  Even in periods of stability I doubt 
If the manufacturer knows with any precision the width of the competitive price 
band in relation to a particular product.  When overall costs are rising he will 
probably continue to increase his prices on a cost plus basis.  During a period 
when demand is also falling and overhead costs are increasing with falling output 
this procedure is not only inflationary but is fraught with da·nger for the manufac-
turer.  In a recession, more than  at other times, manufacturers are under pre-s-- 108-
sure  to depart substantially from cost plus pricing particularly in seeking to retain ot 
enhance their export markets.  Consequently the risk to the home manufacturer from 
the prices of imports is likely to increase.  The home manufacturer may, therefore, 
find  one day that he has announced a cost plus price increase which is simply unaccep-
table to a wide range of buyers and he is forced to withdraw it.  He has risen right 
through his price band; indeed its location may have shifted through changes in pricing 
policies of his competitors.  Unless he can adjust his costs - which may be difficult 
in the short-run- he could be facing a menacing situation.  If his costs are, in fact, 
rising faster than those of his foreign competitors his position will become increas-
ingly precarious; foreign manufacturers can undermine his position on the basis of 
simple cost-plus pricing.  The prices of some imports, (in the absence of keen com-· 
petition among importers), may then be higher than they otherwise would be. 
Page 7  0 and Appendix 5 
The analysis of price applications in Section 2 of each monthly report 
of the NPC  indicated the moderating effect of control on price applications,  which, 
when all reservations are made, I believe to be broadly valid in relation to actual prices. 
There is a second aspect of the work of the NPC which has received better attention 
but is, I think,  of importance.  This is the practice of the Commission of having studies 
in some depth made either by their own Consultancy Unit,  or by outside consultants, 
on particular industries or services, or on particular firms.  The object of these 
studies is to provide fuller information to the Commission,  and to recommend steps 
to improve efficiency.  While these studies have not always led to action by the parties 
concerned there is evidence that in some important cases they stimulated action to im  ... 
prove productivity.  It is however virtually impossible to quantify what is in effect a 
patchy and medium-term result. - 109  -
Appendix 9. 
Unit Cost Indexes 1969-1974 
Tpble A. 9:  Unit o.osts,  in five sectors and in all sectors, of wages and salaries, other 
income,  and total income, 1969-1974 (1968 as 100) 
Agriculture,  Distribution  Public  Other  All 
Year  forestry and  Industry  transport and  administration  domestic  sectors 
fishing  communication  (inc.  rent) 
Remuneration of employees 
1969  110.3  109.9  107.6  109.3  110.7  110.7 
1970  121.3  123.2  119.1  129.1  130.1  125.9 
1971  125.4  135.6  132.3  141.9  143.4  138.3 
1i72  129.3  150.2  144.2  165.3  160.0  153.3 
1973  139.9  164.5  159.5  189.9  187.2  173.7 
1974  152.4  195.6  187.9  224.7  216.4  203.5 
Other income 
1969  104.4  110.6  118.5  114.3  107.2 
1970  107.7  111.9  131.4  110.6  109.6 
C1> 
.-I 
1971  111.8  115.4  138.9  i  114.4  114.2 
0  ..... 
1972  146.0  146.7  147.9  '0.  p.  125.4  139.6 
1973  191.7  127.1  185.8 
(lj 
0  159.8  163.2 
1974  161.7  92.8  163.4  z  173.3  144.6 
Gross domestic product (factor cost) 
1969  105.0  110.0  110.3  109.3  111.9  109.4 
1970  109.2  120.7  122.2  129.1  123.5  119.8 
1971  113.3  131.1  133.9  141.9  133.7  129.4 
1972  144.2  149.4  145.1  165.3  148.4  148.2 
1973  186.1  156.2  166.1  189.9  178.0  169.8 
1974  160.7  172.8  181.7  224.7  201.9  181.7 
Basic Source:  NIE  1974. - 110 -
Appendix 9. 
Table A. 9 (cont'd) 
Notes 
Figures for Other income are net of stock appreciation. 
The data for Table A. 9,  which is revision and updating of Table 1. 2, 
became available at a  Late  stage of this research.  It can be seen that during 1969-1973 
revisions have been slight.  Of particular interest are the statistics relating to 1974  : 
which show sharp rises for each sector in the rate of increase of unit wage cost.  Unit 
cost of Other income falls in every sector except Other domestic (incL.  rent),  the fall 
being particularly sharp in Agriculture and in Industry.  These figures tend to conflr111 
at an aggregate level the detailed analysis of Chapters 2-8. European Communities- Commission 
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